

IRINA WOLF

**Examining the Andijan Conflict
According to the Transcend Approach**

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By Irina Wolf:

Ph.D. student at the psychology department of
Konstanz University, Germany.

E-mail: wolf.irina@gmail.com

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Institute for Integrative Conflict Transformation and Peacebuilding – IICP
Guglgasse 8/4/18, A-1110 Vienna, Austria
iicp@iicp.at
www.iicp.at

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1. Introduction

The Andijan conflict commonly refers to the “indiscriminate killings of civilians” (ODIHR 2005, 4; ICG 2006, 1), brutal suppression of a popular uprising (ICG 2005, 1) and, finally, a “massacre” (HRW 2005, 2) of unarmed people by the Uzbek security forces in Andijan, Uzbekistan on 13th of May, 2005. Some individual researchers, however, declare that “the insurgency was an attempted coup d’etat and not a massacre of innocent civilians” (Baran, Starr, Cornell 2006, 38); “a carefully prepared attack and not a spontaneous demonstration”. (Akiner 2005, 30) Andijan conflict has been in focus of a number of reports issued by international organizations such as International Crises Group (ICG), Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), Human Rights Watch (HRW) as well as of studies of such scholars as Shirin Akiner, John C.K. Daly, Martha Brill Olcott, Zeyno Baran, and Frederick Starr. A lot has been written about the course and aftermath of the conflict; recommendations and possible impacts on foreign policies of the concerned actors have been also thoroughly elaborated.

The aim of this research is not to rewrite what has been said about the Andijan conflict but rather to use all available information in attempt to apply the transcend method of peace building introduced by Johan Galtung. One of the founders of modern peace studies, Galtung developed a way of how to understand the conflict from historical, cultural and structural perspectives searching for root causes of the conflict in deep cultures and structures of the conflicting parties. Essential peculiarity of this method is that while the central notion is to advocate for fulfilment of basic human needs of all conflicting parties it is crucial to help them to find an overarching formula of transcending the conflict rather than suppressing it. (Galtung 1996, Galtung 2000)

Galtung compares peace studies to health studies and looks at it through a prism of a *diagnosis-prognosis-therapy* conflict triangle. (Galtung 1996, 1) Speaking in his language the diagnosis is “a databased analysis”, prognosis is “theory-based predictions of the likely course of an illness”, and therapy is “value- and theory-based intervention.” (Galtung 1996, 16) A table in Annex 1 reveals the logic of the transcend method, which is applied for the purpose of this research. However, given the limitations of this research, the focus is primarily made on the diagnosis part of the conflict transformation rather than on prognosis and therapy.

2. Short history of the Andijan conflict

The uprising of people in Andijan was closely linked to a trial of 23 local businessmen arrested in June 2004 and charged under articles of a criminal code related to maintaining connections to the extremist organization Akromiya. (Daly 2005) Relatives of the defendants link these arrests to the economic success and the growing power of the businessmen in the city, which was highly undesirable by the Uzbek authoritative authorities. The relatives, friends and supporters of the businessmen held peaceful protests in front of the court building for a month waiting for a just and impartial verdict. On 11th of May it was made known that the announcement of a verdict would be postponed to an unknown date. (ICG 2005, 1)

Early morning on the 13th of May “unidentified persons stormed Andijan prison and freed up to 500 detainees, including the businessmen on trial, from their cells”. (ODIHR 2005, 6) In the course of the day, there have been series of actions, including shootings on the part of the government and taking hostages on the part of protestors. Taking an opportunity, thousands of unarmed civilians gathered on the Bobur square in Andijan speaking about their problems of “unemployment, poverty, corruption of local authorities, and injustice linked to the recent arrests and trials.” (ODIHR 2005, 6, 15; HRW 2005, 17)

Rumours about the President Karimov coming to Andijan to meet the protesters and listen to their concerns attracted more and more people to the square. (ODIHR 2005, 15; HRW 2005, 25) “At around 17:00-18:00 hrs there were estimated 10,000-15,000 protesters”...”when the security forces launched a major offensive on the square, attacking simultaneously from different sides”. (ODIHR 2005, 7) The number of the shot dead varies from 175 persons as per Uzbek government data (Akiner 2005, 6) to 300-500 people as per ODIHR and HRW estimates (ODIHR 2005, 8; HRW 2005, 3) and to 3,000 people as per media reports (Akiner 2005, 19) The exact numbers of the dead and wounded, identities of ‘unidentified people storming the prison’ are still not known since the Uzbek government never allowed an independent international investigation into the massacre.

3. Diagnosis from a behaviour perspective explaining historical violence

The initial stage in understanding this conflict requires identifying the conflicting parties, actors, their aims and assumptions which would explain the present and the history of direct violence. While analyzing Andijan conflict, the following relevant conflicting parties and actors should be considered: (1) detained businessmen, (2) protestors as a general mass of people taking part in the meeting on the Bobur square, (3) extremists, allegedly members of Akromiya organization (4) the political opposition, (5) the Uzbek government, (6) and, the international community, including individual states and international organizations.

(1) *Businessmen*: The trial of 23 businessmen accused of *inter alia* being members of the extremist organization Carolina started on February 10, 2005. (ICG report 2005, 2-3). The HRW summarizes the characteristics of the businessmen from various sources as follows.

The defendants' businesses—which included furniture factories, business supply companies, bakeries, tailoring firms, construction companies, and transportation firms—employed thousands of people in impoverished Andijan. The defendants were well known for their role as community leaders. They established a minimum wage that exceeded the meager government-mandated wage, paid employees' medical expenses and sick leave, and provided free meals to staff. They also financially supported a local hospital and orphanage and made donations to local schools and mahalla, or local neighbourhood, committees. (Rotar and ICG quoted in HRW report 2005)

In the introduction to Akiner's *Independent Assessment* of violence in Andijan, Frederick Starr poses a question whether the detained businessmen were honest entrepreneurs or "corrupt rent-seekers funding Islamic extremism with profits from illegal deals with the previous administration that had been exposed by a new governor?" (Akiner 2005, 5) Akiner herself avoids addressing the goals and assumptions of the detained businessmen and only mentions the fact that she met both, those who spoke pro and those who spoke against the businessmen. (Akiner 2005, 29)

It could've been easier, however, to accept that the underlying goals of businessmen were other than economic freedoms and growth of their businesses if not the fact, that another group of 13 Andijan businessmen had been arrested on similar charges in the beginning of 2005. (ODIHR report 2005, 6) The major assumption of the businessmen was that the government had fabricated the criminal pursuit against them due to the fact that their success and philanthropic activities could not be simply ignored by the local authorities. (ICG 2005, 3-4). In this sense, the contradictions between the businessmen and government

were based not solely on economic but also on socio-political issues. At the moment the fate of the 23 businessmen is not quite clear.

(2) *Protesters*: According to the ICG report a group of protesters initially consisted of relatives, neighbours, friends and former employees of the detained businessmen, who held peaceful, silent civil protests in front of the court daily for about a month; making no vocal demands the protestors were very well organized with men sitting at one side and women at the other. However, the number of protestors gradually grew and by mid-May there were around 3000 people silently advocating for a just verdict. (ICG 2005, 3) The goal of this party to the conflict was fair trial over the businessmen as well as social and economic justice. Given the explicitly unjust hearings in the court including postponing of an announcement of the verdict to an indefinite time, tensions between the protesters and the government grew significantly. Major assumption of relatives and supporters was that the government would pay attention to their peaceful protests and the problem would be solved by non-violent means. Reportedly, protestors went to the extent of writing a letter to President Karimov and 24 human rights nongovernmental organizations hoping to restore justice, i.e. release of defendants. (ODIHR 2005, 10)

In her assessment of events Akiner concludes, however, that “this was not a demonstration mounted by peaceful civilians, but an action undertaken by armed men with some degree of military training.” Akiner does not make a distinction between unarmed and armed people calling the whole group of protestors “insurgents”. (Akiner 2005, 30-31) One should, however, differentiate between the thousands of unarmed protestors and up to 100 criminals that took arms in their possession by attacking local police and military station on the night from 12th to 13th May. (HRW 2005, 10; ICG 2005, 1) Since it is not excluded that the mentioned criminal acts might have been orchestrated by extremists, this group is to be considered as a separate actor in the Andijan conflict.

(3) *Extremists*. The official version of the Uzbek government was that all actions were performed by the criminals and relatives of the criminals representing Acromiya extremist organization, a splinter of the banned Hizb ut-Tahrir party. The protestors were named Islamists having connections with international terrorist organization. (Burnashev and Chernykh 2007, 68)

Akromiya organization is a rather vague movement and could hardly be classified as an extremist one. Sarah Kendzior asserts that “Acromiya, by the accounts of many Uzbek and

international human rights groups, political organizations, journalists, citizens and accused Akromists themselves, does not exist.” (Kendzior 2006, 546) She provides a range of arguments stating that Akromiya is a myth, invented by the Uzbek state-sponsored propaganda for imprisoning hundreds of dissidents or opposition leaders charged on affiliation with extremist activities. (Kendzior 2006, 545-548) Reportedly, Akromiya was founded in the 1990s by Akrom Yuldashev, a 29 year old math teacher and a former member of Hizb ut-Tahrir. (Sandee 2006, 2; ICG 2005, 2) The main goal of the followers of this philosophy is to join efforts for collective development and self-organization. Yuldashev’s main idea was that Muslim entrepreneurs should cooperate rather than compete, pooling their money for the common good. The Uzbek government has often declared that the true Akromists intentions were to overthrow the government. (ICG 2005, 2)

However, one cannot exclude that among the assumptions of those inspired by Akrom Yuldashev’s teaching could be that the authoritarian state of Uzbekistan is creating serious obstacles to Akromiya philosophy and should be replaced. Due to rather scarce access to objective information, it is very difficult to state without reservation that the so-called extremists have organized the civil unrest. Indeed, the role of this group in the events of May 13th in Uzbekistan should be neither overestimated nor misinterpreted. A year later the American researchers wrote in their report that “the West still does not have a sense of who the insurgents were... The role of Islamists in the uprising was generally not recognized.” (Baran, Starr, Cornell 2006, 37)

(4) *Opposition*: Uzbekistan is a clan society and the division of spheres of influences is strongly controlled by the incumbent political elite, which has been ruthlessly suppressing any opposition in the country. Ideally, the goal of any political opposition should be to come to power. It is unlikely that the Uzbek opposition wanted to overthrow the government via demonstrations in a remote area of Uzbekistan given the fact that opposition in Uzbekistan was not organized as that in Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan prior to ‘colour revolutions’. During the events in Andijan, the major assumption of the opposition was that socially and economically oppressed people would go to the square and express their dissatisfaction. The opposition rather hoped to gain more support from the Uzbek people and press the government to allow plurality in the society and ease its rigid economic and public policies.

(5) *Government*: Since the collapse of the Soviet Union President Karimov managed to stay in power for more than 15 years and he has explicitly proven that he is by no means inclined to give up that power. Thus, the major goal of the government was to preserve the status

quo even though it was the ground for serious tensions within the society and economic and social vulnerability of the people. The possible assumptions of the Uzbek government or may be justification of its authoritarian rule could be described as follows. Since 1990s Uzbekistan was a major hindrance for Islamic extremists to spread their ideology throughout the Central Asian region. After the government overthrow in Kyrgyzstan in March 2005, the Uzbek leadership had clearly indicated that colour revolutions in Kyrgyzstan, Ukraine and Georgia were organized and funded by the West; something “evil” like that must not take place in Uzbekistan since it would lead to irreversible consequences in the region. (Information Agency of MFA, Uzbekistan, 2005) When the conflict broke out in Andijan in mid-May, 2005 the assumption of the government was that it was necessary to contain the conflict within the city and not to let it spread across the country. The brutal slaughter of the protesters in the square was needed for the sake of maintaining stability throughout the country and the region.

The subsequent excerpt from the HRW report provides the following characteristic of the Uzbek state, which is important for better understanding of both the goals and assumptions of the Uzbek authorities.

The government of Uzbekistan exercises tight control over most aspects of public life and imposes restrictions on all avenues of peaceful civic participation. It has a long record of formal and informal censorship of the media, intimidating independent civil society activists, severely restricting public demonstrations, and banning political parties that are not loyal to the government. (HRW 2005, 51)

(6) *International Community*. The mixed reaction of the international community to the events in Andijan became the major turning point of the Uzbek foreign policy. There was a clear split between the position of the Western states including the USA and the EU and Russia along with China. Whereas the EU and human rights organizations strongly condemned the Uzbek government for committing a mass murder of civilians, Russia and China supported President Karimov’s approach justifying the bloodshed by struggle against extremism. (ICG 2005, 2) Thus, it is impossible to speak of a common position of the international community as an actor in the conflict.

While the main goal of the UN, the EU and the ODIHR was protection of human rights and negotiating the possibility of international mediation and investigation, the goal of Russia and China was maintaining and reinforcing cooperation with the authoritarian Uzbek government in order to promote their own national interests in the region. Finally, the EU introduced a

visa ban for 12 Uzbek officials presumably responsible for a massacre and an embargo on exports to Uzbekistan of arms, military equipment and other equipment that might be used for internal repression. (EU Council 14392/05)

The position of the USA was not immediately clear and there are virtually no references to the U.S. reaction in any of the reports on Andijan events. Nevertheless, referring to the White House reaction the journalist Zunes states that "rather than condemning the massacre, the White House called for "restraint" from both sides and claimed that Islamic terrorist groups" may have been behind the protests that prompted the shootings. (Zunes 2005) The U.S. did, however, cut the foreign aid support following the Andijan conflict. (Hill and Jones 2006, 119) Thus, on one hand the U.S. had many reasons to preserve relationships with Uzbekistan including those of maintaining its military base and ensuring access to the Uzbek energy resources. On the other hand, strongly advocating for human rights and democracy around the world the White House could not just ignore the massacre of hundreds of people.

Having considered the relevant actors in the Andijan conflict it is now to conclude a diagnosis from a behaviour perspective. Following the Galtung's logic, the Andijan conflict occurred because, *inter alia*, goals and interests of the conflicting parties were contradictory to each other. The extremists presumably wanted to destabilize the situation in the country and to overthrow the secular government whereas the government was interested in preserving stability and its authoritarian regime by all means. On the other hand, the protesters including businessmen and their supporters wanted to have more democratic features such as rule of law, economic freedoms, freedom of speech etc. The diagnosis from cultural and structural perspective will shed more light on the very root causes of the conflict in focus.

4. Diagnosis from an attitudes/assumptions perspective explaining cultural violence

Unlike indicated in the table in Annex 1, the diagnosis from a contradiction perspective will be followed after the diagnosis from an attitudes/assumptions perspective because in case of the Andijan conflict the 'structural violence' can be better understood once the reader possesses some knowledge about the 'cultural violence' of the Uzbek society. Thus, according to Galtung the first set of syndromes of a deep culture of a nation (cosmology) are chosenness ("the idea of being a people chosen by transcendental forces"), myths ("of past and future glories"), and trauma ("of being a people hit and hurt by others"), which will be further referred to as a CMT syndrome. (Galtung 1996, 253-254) Another set of deep culture syndromes is dichotomous thinking (either...or), manicheism ("one is good and the other is evil"), and Armageddon (the need for final battle), which will be further referred to as a DMA syndrome. (Galtung 1996, 271)

Galtung considers CMT syndrome of a deep culture of nations as one based on the religious assumptions of nations to be chosen by God. Being under USSR rule over 70 years the Uzbek culture has lost its assumption as being chosen by God. Instead the Uzbek government had to find a reason to be 'a chosen nation' and to find a way different from a religious one fearing the Muslim radicalization of a society. In order to enhance the notion of a national identity and to give the Uzbek nation a sense of being chosen the Uzbek government recalled a historical figure of Amir Timur (Tamerlane) after the break up of the Soviet Union. The words of President Karimov on the walls of the Tashkent museum say, "If somebody wants to understand who the Uzbeks are, if somebody wants to comprehend all the power, might, justice and unlimited abilities of the Uzbek people, their contribution to the global development, their belief in the future, he should recall the image of Amir Timur [Tamerlane]." (McMahon quoted in Sulaymanov 2004, 12) Although Tamerlane was not an ethnic Uzbek, the fact that he lived and was buried on the modern territory of Uzbekistan gave a sufficient ground to link him to the modern titular nation of Uzbekistan. Within several years of the Uzbek independence there were a number of monuments erected to honour Tamerlane, a Timurids museum has been constructed, schools, streets, administrative districts, public organizations and a state medal were named after him. (Sulaymanov 2004, 13) Whereas Tamerlane was celebrated as an ideological symbol of Uzbekistan, "...his fourteenth century empire has turned out to be the "golden age" of the Uzbek nation." (Sulaymanov 2004, 23) "By omitting critique of Tamerlane's brutal campaigns and authoritarian rule, the state spurred people to glorify Tamerlane and draw comparisons between his medieval empire and modern Uzbekistan." (Sulaymanov 2004, 13)

Comparison of President Karimov with Tamerlane is another part of chosenness syndrome. “The latter is believed to be a great leader, who created a great empire, who glorified the region, and who had his capital in Samarkand. The former –President Karimov – is [also] from Samarkand, he glorifies Uzbekistan (in his books and speeches), and sounds as trying to unite the people of Uzbekistan.” (Sulaymanov 2004, 13) President Karimov also admitted, “I understand that some forces are anxious to present Karimov as a dictator... I agree that some of my actions seem authoritarian. But I can easily explain this. In historic periods, especially, when people attain statehood or in transition period from one system to another a strong executive power is indispensable. It is necessary to avoid confrontations and bloodshed.” (McMahon quoted in Sulaymanov 2004, 33) Therefore, it can be concluded that re-writing the history was an attempt of the Uzbek government to legitimize the authoritarian regime of Karimov. The myth of Tamerlane has once again been resurrected to glorify the past of the Uzbek people. According to Shirin Akiner, “today many Uzbeks regard him [Tamerlane] as the spiritual founder of their nation.” (Akiner 1997, 369)

Trauma of the Uzbek deep culture can be understood from the school textbook of ‘History of Uzbekistan’ where the historians declare, “History itself is the witness of the self-sacrificing struggle for independence. ... Our people [supposedly referring to the Uzbeks] have experienced the yoke of Akhemenids [Persian dynasty of the fifth-fourth centuries B.C.], invasion of troops of Alexander the Great, oppression of Arabs, attacks by Genghis Khan and Batyi, and invasion of tsarist Russia. The same history remembers infamous drive of the conquerors [out of the region].” (Juraev and Faizullaev quoted in Sulaymanov, 2004, 22) Trauma of always been invaded and oppressed was later again glorified by bringing examples of ‘the great Uzbek state’ under the rule of Tamerlane.

The DMA syndrome of the Uzbek deep culture relevant to the present research is reflected in the official stance on Muslim extremism. Dichotomous thinking of the Uzbek authorities is reflected in the assumption that the state can be either secular or Islamic. Manecheism - a secular state is good; an Islamic one is evil and radical. Armageddon, in the Uzbek case, is a battle between the secular government and Muslim extremist organizations for power. Andijan conflict was certainly not the final battle yet.

To conclude a diagnosis from a cultural perspective it is essential to emphasize that following Galtung’s logic, direct violence in Andijan conflict was allowed because of deep assumptions of the Uzbek government that brutal suppression of an uprising is justified for

preserving the state; the DMA syndrome was a reason why there was no differentiation made between criminals and civilians, while all followers of Islam religion were considered to be extremists and radicals uprising against the secular state.

5. Diagnosis from a contradiction perspective explaining structural violence

According to Galtung, deep culture is much interconnected with deep structure of a society and in order to find and address root causes of a conflict one should have clear understanding of both. Syndromes of deep structure can be vertical, i.e. repression, penetration, segmentation, fragmentation, and exclusion, or horizontal, i.e. too much or too little interaction.

The penetration syndrome of the Uzbek society can be explained by the fact that the state propaganda makes the grass roots believe that hierarchy is natural. It is observed not only through comparisons of Karimov to Tamerlane but also by the fact that media is tightly controlled by the Uzbek state and only state-favourable information is allowed to be released. According to Committee to Protect Journalists, Uzbekistan was rated as one of the 10 most censored countries in 2006 with Karimov having "...re-established a Soviet-style dictatorship that relies on brutal political intimidation to silence journalists, human rights activists, and the political opposition. Karimov's regime uses an informal system of state censorship to prevent the domestic media from reporting on widespread police torture, poverty, and an Islamic opposition movement." (Committee to Protect Journalists 2006)

Segmentation syndrome is present in the Uzbek society just like any other Central Asian state because it is a subject to regionalism and tribalism. In Uzbekistan people divide themselves according to the area of their residence, i.e. Samarkand, Tashkent, Bukhara, Ferghana valley, etc. It is not accidental that the majority of government officials under rule of Karimov appear to be people from Samarkand, the place where Karimov himself was born and where Tamerlane had his capital. The political figures from other regions have been effectively excluded from participating in political life of Uzbekistan and have difficult access to information and resources. (Sulaymanov 2004, 13-14; Knjazev 2005)

Apart from being regionally divided the Uzbek society is also fragmented into various groups and exchange of communication is generally not allowed in the system. As Akiner puts it, "Central Asian states are not mono-ethnic units, but complex, plural societies, with large immigrant populations. The privileging of the heritage of one group over and above that of the others inevitably gives rise to resentment and fears of ethnocratic domination. In a time of acute social and economic stress, such as exists today, this readily leads to ethnic polarization and marginalization." (Akiner 1997, 363)

Thus, the direct violence in Andijan could be a result of the structural violence, i.e. the conflict potential persisted in the repressed, fragmented, segmented and marginalized

society with little or no vertical and horizontal interaction. However, ‘contradiction’ as a part of a conflict triangle also includes such tasks as analysis of whether the basic human needs of the conflicting parties were satisfied and differing between their ‘legitimate’ and ‘illegitimate’ goals.

Basic human needs (BHN) - survival, well-being, identity, and freedom - are minimal set of needs that each individual strives for; they are “absolute and non-negotiable”. (Galtung 2004, 2; Galtung 2000, 35) In case of Andijan conflict, extreme difference between satisfaction of BHN of the ruling elite and total deprivation of the protestors and quasi opposition of survival, well-being, identity, and freedom might have been the main reason of the conflict situation and such outrageous violence. (Table 1)

Table 1: Fulfilment of BHN of the conflicting parties in the Andijan conflict

	Survival	Well-being	Identity	Freedom
Uzbek President Karimov and the ruling elite	Fulfilled	Fulfilled	Fulfilled	Fulfilled
Protestors and quasi opposition	Not fulfilled	Not fulfilled	Not fulfilled	Not fulfilled
Islamic Extremists	Not fulfilled	Arguable	Not fulfilled	Not fulfilled

Satisfaction of all BHN of all conflicting parties is a long-term goal that requires good will of the government and comprehensive reforms of the Uzbek society. However, as Galtung warns “[T]he significance for conflict transformation is obvious: any outcome of a conflict that neglects one or more basic human needs is a non-transformation”. (Galtung 2000, 35)

Furthermore, according to Galtung the root causes of the conflict are those driven by incompatibility of two or more goals of the conflicting parties. However, not all goals of the parties are legitimate and should be advocated for. (Galtung 2000, 33-34) Therefore, legitimate goals of protestors, opposition and businessmen were improving lives of people, fighting unemployment and poverty, maintaining rule of law, having freedom of speech, reforming social sphere, etc. Legitimate goal of Islamic extremists was fulfilment of their basic human needs, in particular, preserving their identity and freedom. Legitimate goal of the Uzbek government was preserving stability in Uzbekistan, Ferghana Valley, and Central Asian region.

Illegitimate goal of protestors, opposition, businessmen and extremists was an intention, if any, to change the government in an unconstitutional way. The illegitimate goals of the government in person of Mr. Karimov and the ruling elite were to suppress any attempt of

the people to protest, to ensure stability in the country by means of suppression and repression, by staying in power for an indefinite time and solely enjoying economic benefits of the state.

To summarize, although unspoken, the legitimate goals of all conflicting parties were the same. They all strove for fulfilment of their basic human needs. Whereas President Karimov strove for preserving survival, well-being, freedoms and identity, each representative of protestors, opposition, businessmen and extremists strove for the same. People wanted well-being (no poverty, no unemployment, etc.), freedoms (of speech, to assembly, to do business, etc.), identity (to be Muslim, to belong to certain political party, etc.), and finally to survive physically from government's repressions and repressive economic policies. The Muslim believers could indeed radicalize because they were not only deprived of their BHN but also because the Uzbek government left no legitimate mechanisms of achieving them by peaceful means.

6. A short discourse on a prognosis phase

For Galtung “[A] prognosis is a trajectory through future time...that yields the best estimate of the patient’s illness/wellness situation”. (Galtung 1996, 25) However, after the Andijan events the majority of researchers and analysts tried to explain why it happened rather than making predictions of what might happen next.

Nevertheless, Martha Brill Ollcott, senior academician of Carnegie Fund, provided four possible scenarios of development of the situation in Uzbekistan. According to the first scenario, if the government does not initiate political and economic reforms, the uprisings like those in Andijan will take place in various parts of Uzbekistan simultaneously and the state will collapse because of impossibility to suppress all of them with force. As per the second scenario, the Uzbek state will collapse from inside. The ruling elite might change the leader or leaders and preserve the current regime. The new government, however, will pay more attention to “Uzbek values” such as religion. According to the third scenario, the new government will try to initiate reforms. However, a government that suppresses coups by military forces is usually not interested in serious changes. Finally, President Karimov might understand that in order to ensure himself a place in history he must change his regime not through declarations and statements but through real reforms in economy (cotton prices should be up to market), politics (freedom of speech), and judiciary aiming at enhancing level of peoples’ lives. If President Karimov doesn’t change methods of governing, Uzbekistan might face civil war. (Olcott 2005, 99-100)

However, unlike it is envisaged in these four scenarios, during the two consequent years after the conflict President Karimov has strengthened his regime to a greater extent. For example, the ICG reported a year later that the situation of the opposition has drastically worsened.

...the Andijan events were followed by a massive crackdown on opposition and independent political and religious voices throughout the country. Over 200 people have received prison sentences in trials that, with the exception of the first, have been conducted behind the closed doors. (ICG 2006, 5)

The Economist provided several examples of how those accused of involvement in the uprising were arrested, intimidated and found dead shortly before or after a verdict. (The Economist 12/17/2005, 1-2)

Andijan conflict also became a turning point of the Uzbek foreign policy. The pro-American ministers were replaced with pro-Russian ministers, the American airbase was closed “by

expelling NATO altogether and forbidding it from overflying Uzbek airspace.” (The Economist 12/17/2005, 1-2) Shortly after Andijan events Uzbekistan signed a \$600 million oil deal with China (HRW Sept. 2005, 66) and a military agreement with Russia allowing it to deploy its military units in case of destabilization of the situation in the region. (Finn 2005) As per data of 2007, there were virtually no functioning non-governmental organizations in the Uzbekistan with [a]lmost all U.S. –based NGOs were forced to leave, as were a number of European ones, though to a much lesser extent”. (ICG 2007; 11)

The EU continued, however, to pressurize Uzbekistan from various sides. The visa ban of the EU for the 12 Uzbek authorities originally introduced for one year has been twice prolonged for the consequent six months. (ICG 2007, 14) The U.K. retail giant Tesco has introduced a ban for Uzbek cotton justifying this decision by use of organized and forced child labour in Uzbekistan. Annual export revenues of its cotton crop ensured around \$980 million for Karimov’s regime with Europe being its major consumer. (Yarns and Fibers Exchange 2008)

Although Karimov’s latest seven-year presidential term expired in January 2007, he continues to be in power. Making an in-depth analysis of Uzbekistan two years since Andijan conflict the ICG researchers concluded that „[T]here seems little outsiders can do for now to influence political events inside Uzbekistan. Perhaps the best that is possible is to continue what support can still be provided to ordinary citizens, while working to prevent potential unrest within the country from spilling into the wider region”. (ICG 2007, 15)

7. A short discourse on a therapy phase

As mentioned a therapy for Galtung is a value- and theory based intervention that helps the trajectory of prognosis go upwards, i.e. away from death to wellness. (Galtung 1996, 25) In his chapter on conflict interventions, Galtung proposes eleven approaches depending on how much communication among the conflicting and concerned parties take place. In case of Uzbekistan it is 'A: Type 0', i.e. no communication with outside parties; dissociation: disintegration, fission. In this case, the parties "may not be ready for any conflict transformation process beyond the non-formation". (Galtung 1996, 104)

A long road should be taken by peace builders in order to transform the conflict situation in Uzbekistan. The official Tashkent realizes that sooner or later the tensions in the society will reach its apogee and lead to a serious instability in the country. Preserving rule of law, strengthening of the civil society, liberalization of the economy and mass media, developing tolerance and pluralism in the society are by far the scarce list of urgent steps Uzbekistan should ideally take to prevent such instability. Whereas at the moment there is no evidence of Uzbekistan willing to open up its regime, shed blood of people will not be forgotten, and the suppressed conflict in Andijan might erupt sooner or later but with a bigger force and more intense in the essence.

8. Conclusion

The factual information about the numbers of dead and identities of participants in the Andijan uprising is still not known; the independent investigation, if ever allowed, is also unlikely to reveal the truth about what happened and who is to be accountable for killings in Andijan. However, this conflict was an important turning point in the history of Uzbekistan and its relations with the leading powers of the world, hence, worth been scrutinized again and again to learn the lessons from the past in order to understand the future of Uzbekistan.

Identifying the root causes of any conflict is crucial not only for better comprehension of a conflict and finding solutions for a lasting peace but also for understanding the potential of future conflicts. The transcend method of Johan Galtung provides practical techniques on how to look for the root causes in deep structures and cultures of nations. Galtung asserts that “[T]he combination of so-called chosen cultures and repressive social structures almost invariably and fairly speedily results in direct violence; from below in order to liberate, and from above in order to prevent liberation.” (Galtung and Ikeda 1995, 69) This citation alone allows explaining that the eruption of the direct violence in Andijan was an inevitable result of the repressive Uzbek regime in combination with the choseness syndrome of the Uzbek state leader Karimov solely occupying the state power. Striving for liberation the Uzbek people will sometime again demand satisfaction of their basic human needs. The Uzbek government is very likely to prevent any such attempt by violent means unless the social structures of the Uzbek state are thoroughly reformed in accordance with democratic traditions.

In this regard, the role of the international community should not be minimized to issuing condemning reports and introduction of sanctions, which appear to be useful only in isolating Uzbekistan politically and economically, harming mostly the Uzbek civilians (cotton farmers) and not the Uzbek regime. Pushing for democratization in the neighbouring countries, if not in Uzbekistan itself, is one possibility, but initiating mediation process within Uzbekistan by real experts in conflict transformation could be an ideal start for opening up Uzbekistan. It appears that the internal potential of peace building is almost non-existent due to the weakness of civil society and a harsh stand of the Uzbek regime on western NGO's. The existent international expertise could be an asset in transforming the conflict potential in Uzbekistan, but to win a good will of the Uzbek government has been proved to be not an easy task. However, for Galtung a missing political will is not an excuse, for him it is 'good ideas' that are missing, good ideas that would make a twist in such a creative way that would transform a conflict by peaceful means. (Galtung 2004, 161)

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