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**EXPLORING THE SERBIAN IMPLICIT CULTURE IN
RELATION TO KOSOVO:
Thoughts and Experiences
of Young Adults from Kosovo and Serbia**

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Dedicated to

The friends and lecturers from the EPU
who have left a tremendously positive
impact in my life

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Contents

Conceptualizing Conflict, Goals and Needs of Warring Parties.....	5
Introduction	5
Overview of Different Reasons for Conflict	8
Explanation of causes of wars according to Argyle (1992).....	8
Explanation of causes of wars according to Katz and Braly (1965).....	8
Conflict and Basic Needs	10
Identity, Group Processes and Intergroup Conflict.....	14
Identity, National Identity and the Role of Myths	14
Group Formation and Group Dynamics during Conflict	17
Description of 'Us' and 'Them' and Presence of Stereotypes and Prejudice.....	20
Perception of Albanians.....	22
Perception of 'us', Serbs.....	23
Methodology	26
Methodological Choice.....	26
Tools	26
Participants	27
Procedure	28
Results and Analysis	30
Coding Procedure	30
Conflict Development in the Region of Kosovo	33
Origin in time	33
Reasons for conflict.....	34
Goals of Serbs and Albanians	35
Actors in the conflict	37
Relationship between Serbs and Albanians through Time.....	41

Through history until 1989	41
Years from 1989 until 1997	42
Years from 1997 until 1999	43
Post 1999 until the present time	44
Beliefs about the Region of Kosovo	46
The territory	46
Mistakes in the past.....	47
Blame	48
Victims.....	49
Perception of Basic Needs and Requests of Serbs and Albanians.....	50
Basic needs.....	50
Legitimate requests	51
Illegitimate requests.....	52
Perceptions of Different Ethnic Groups in Kosovo	54
Serbs	54
Albanians.....	55
What Albanians might say about Serbs.....	57
Turks, Roma and other minorities	57
The Future of Kosovo	59
Expected future	59
Ideal future	60
Steps of achieving the ideal scenario.....	61
Lessons learnt.....	61
Conclusion.....	63
Final Thoughts	63
Limitations of the Study and Suggestions for Further Research	70
Conclusion	71
References.....	72
Appendices	76

Chapter One

Conceptualizing Conflict, Goals and Needs of Warring Parties

Introduction

I come from a country that has been involved in a number of violent conflicts for the past 15 years. I consider myself lucky enough to have left in 1995, but for the majority of people from Serbia, years from 1991 until 1999 represented life filled with suffering and hardship, with the effects of wars creating single parent families, orphan children and hundreds of thousands of displaced persons. Apart from economical problems, war and conflict created numerous psychological problems for the people. It left a long and distinctive trace on everyone's life, regardless of where in the country a person lived and what his or her role in the conflict was. Being just an 'average' citizen meant that the person faced life with extremely low salaries, lived under economic and cultural sanctions, had daily threats of mobilization, experienced 78 days of NATO bombing and a very unpredictable future, not knowing what suffering the next day might bring. At present time, although no open conflict exists, persons are still facing many hardships in their daily life. The consequences of the previous wars continue to have their influence and have not yet been dealt with.

What I would like to find out through this research is what effect this had on the persons who were growing up at such a turbulent time and examine their beliefs about the conflicts. Since a general study of all the recent conflicts would have been too broad, it was decided to focus on the most recent conflict, which occurred in the province of Kosovo. The reason for choosing this particular conflict is the fact that, although the violence has currently abated, the status of the region is still not clear and neither is the future for the people living there, so the conflict is still 'fresh' and very relevant at this point in time. It is also a region where during the last decade and more, the relationship between Albanian and Serb population resembled apartheid (Vučo, 2001). Furthermore, the topic of Kosovo inevitably produces a reaction among people. This is because one rarely finds a person living in Serbia who has absolutely no opinion of this conflict. It is a very hot and widely debated topic at the moment, with variety of strong opinions being heard and very little consensus on what is the best solution.

The history and the origins of the conflict are also widely disputed. People disagree on the relationship and behaviour of Albanians and Serbs towards each other and fail to agree on the date when the latest conflict started. Choosing 'the beginning' of the conflict is as hard as finding solutions to it. Why? Because Kosovo has been shifted for centuries from Serbian to Albanian rule and vice versa, and during each change of rule, revenge and atrocities were committed by the ruling nation. Each nation claims that their own behaviour was a response for the crimes committed by the other group in the past. Choosing a starting date for this latest conflict is hard because there is always a 'period before' that needs to be taken into account to grasp the roots of conflict today. For example, Isakovic (1997) alone identifies three instances of conflict escalations in Kosovo: 1968 (when there were demonstrations demanding that Kosovo province obtains the status of a republic); 1981 (when large

scale student demonstrations took place, which started over the canteen food at University but progressed to demands of Kosovo to become a republic) and 1997/1998 (when violence between Serbs and Albanians became a daily reality). The people cannot even agree on who inhabited Kosovo first. Serbs tend to claim that they were the first settlers, while Albanians generally argue that the first Kosovo settlers were Illyrians, predecessors of Albanians. Therefore, there is no universally accepted history related to the origins neither of first settlers nor about the beginning of the conflict. The issue on which all sides agree is that there has been conflict going on for long, and that horrible crime, murders and exodus of people took place in the region.

For the people not familiar with the Balkan region, I would like to describe briefly the location and give a short description of the present situation. Kosovo is a region bordering with the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Albania and Serbia and Montenegro. Kosovo is still formally a province of the Republic of Serbia, but is administered under the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) as a protectorate. The main topic of discussion among people as well as politicians at the moment is over the final status of Kosovo: whether it will remain part of Serbia or will become independent.

Since 1999, there has been no Serbian police or army in Kosovo. Instead the region is protected by the Kosovo Force (KFOR), which is a NATO-led international force responsible for establishing and maintaining security in Kosovo; UNMIK police and by Kosovo Police Service (KPS) forces. UNMIK administration is the main governing body at the moment and KFOR forces are answerable to it.

The region of Kosovo is inhabited by Albanians¹ (88%), Serbs (7%) and Turks, Roma, Ashkali, Gorani and other minorities (5%) (Statistical Office of Kosovo, 2000). Before the arrival of KFOR forces in July 1999, the numbers of Serbs according to the national census of 1991 were larger, reaching 9.9 % of the population, while Albanians comprised 82.2 % of the province's population. One of the reasons for change in demographics is that after the NATO bombing and withdrawal of Serbian troops; many people fled, were expelled or decided to leave and have a more peaceful life somewhere else. Prior to the NATO bombing, from 1997-1999, there was violence between the Serbian police and the army and Kosovo Liberation Army, as well as violence by these groups towards the civilians of the opposing side. The formal split in the region occurred in 1990/1991, when parallel institutions were established. This meant that society was divided: Serbs and Albanians had separate schools, worked separately and each had their own 'administration', their own president, separate taxes and so on. This was caused by the decision in 1989 to make changes in the constitution and to remove the status of Autonomous province of Kosovo and join it to Serbia.

All that happened during the 1990's was only a culmination of the quiet conflict that had been simmering for some time, where both Serbs and Albanians were dissatisfied over various issues at different time periods. There is a lot more to say about the history of the region and origins of the conflict and for complete understanding of historical complexities which have their own reflections today it is advisable to consult some of the books about the history of Kosovo. Further analysis of this issue is not possible here, as it is not the focus of this study. This study focuses on the *beliefs* and *perceptions* of people about the conflict, rather than on the

¹ Throughout this dissertation when the Albanians are mentioned, it refers to the Albanians living in Kosovo, unless explicitly stated otherwise.

facts of the conflict. After all, what shapes one's attitudes and actions is the *belief* about how things are and not always on how things *really* are.

This study seeks to examine the opinion of young Serbian people from Kosovo and Serbia in order to see what is it that they believe and feel about this conflict and see if any differences exist between these two groups. The study aims to explore what view these young adults hold, how important this issue is for them and how they perceive their own nation as well as other groups living in Kosovo. Particularly interesting will be the comparison of views on the perception of the 'other' ethnic groups in Kosovo between youth who lived in Kosovo and had personal experience of the ethnic groups living in Kosovo and those who did not, since they lived all their life in Belgrade. The reason why these two groups of participants were chosen was to see whether, and how, direct experience of the conflict and living with the nation one is in conflict with, shapes the perceptions, beliefs, attitudes and feelings of young people towards the conflict and the nations involved in the conflict.

Inevitably, a focus in such a study is the exploration of the group dynamics, relationships with members of the 'other' groups, perception of the ingroup and outgroup and the role of prejudices and stereotypes in the conflict. The main focus of the research can be summarized under the name of 'implicit culture' and the role it plays in determining the perception of conflict, conflicting parties, their needs and goals. According to Krech, Crutchfield and Ballachey (1962) the implicit culture refers to a) the knowledge, beliefs and myths, b) value system and c) norms of a particular society. For the members of a society, myths really exist, they are thought to be true and have a strong role in shaping their perceptions and life paths. Beliefs and myths are the 'lens' through which they see the world and through which they attribute the meaning of certain events. Values refer to people's belief about what is right or wrong, what should be strived for and what should be avoided. Norms, the third component of implicit culture, refer to standards and general rules accepted by the members of society. They include customs, norms of individuals' behaviour and institutional norms. The most important norms for a particular society are institutional norms, as they are the ones that set the standards of how one should behave in particular situations. So for example, an institutional norm of a particular group might be that when a country is threatened, all capable members of society are asked to sign up and join the army.

The implicit culture can be used to explain the outer, visible manifestations of the culture, i.e. the explicit culture. Talking about Kosovo, what is aimed to be understood is the implicit culture: the processes, beliefs and opinions that people hold. One should try to understand how these affect the outer, manifest behaviour, since it is the implicit culture which to a significant degree determines how members of a particular group will act in different situations.

In this dissertation, chapter one is dedicated to the exploration of reasons over which conflicts occur and its relation to the fulfilment of basic needs. Chapter two focuses on the identity issues and the role it plays in conflicts and ingroup and outgroup perceptions. Chapter three gives a detailed description of the methodology of the study, while chapter four is dedicated to the results of the study and its analysis in light of the previous research done. Chapter five is a concluding chapter, dealing with general thoughts, implications and limitations of the study.

Overview of Different Reasons for Conflict

Conflicts are a very natural and essential part of every individual's and society's life. The ideal is not to eliminate conflict as such, but to prevent and remove the types of conflict that take on a violent expression. Conflicts, if non-violent, give us a chance for growth and further development, but if they take on a violent expression, they cause harm, destruction and should therefore be transformed. A definition of conflict according to Galtung (1996) is that it is a dispute arising over an incompatibility, a contradiction between goals, involving both attitudes and behavioural components. In order to understand wars, which can be described as violent conflicts between nations, it is important to explore the possible reasons over which these conflicts take place.

Different scholars create different categories of reasons over which wars occur. Here, only two of the divisions that are mentioned in the literature will be discussed.

Explanation of causes of wars according to Argyle (1992)

According to Argyle (1992), causes of wars can be divided into the following three main categories: economic, political and ideological and leaders' factors:

- a. Economic factors were long seen as the main reason for conflict, since they involve competition over scarce resources, including territory. However, lately the other two factors have been gaining more prominence among the scholars of war and peace issues. Applied to the case of Kosovo, if defined as conflict due to economic factors, it would relate to the fact that both Serbs and Albanians blamed the other side for their bad economic situation and used statistics to 'prove' that the hardships they face are due to the 'other' (Džuda, 2003).
- b. Political factors refer to issues such as nations trying to expand or search for glory and security; cases of minority peoples seeking freedom and nations trying to maintain national sovereignty over a territory. Again, the violence in Kosovo could be seen as having some roots in the political factors, where the minority Albanians (minority in Yugoslavia, but majority in Kosovo) fight for their independence and freedom from the Serbs, while Serbs are fighting to maintain national sovereignty and security for the Serbs in the region.
- c. Wars fought over ideological factors are usually about religion or the type of regime (e.g. communism vs. democracy) and are fought by leaders who mobilise the people and rationalise the war by exploiting the ideology. Some reference to ideological and leader factors could be made to Kosovo conflict. Religion of the people in the region is different, with Serbs being predominantly Orthodox and Albanians predominantly Muslim. Besides this difference, there were politicians like Milošević (who was the elected president of Serbia 1990 and elected president of Yugoslavia in 1997), who have exploited the national history and the current situation to divide the people along ethnic lines even more and exacerbate hostility and insecurity.

Explanation of causes of wars according to Katz and Braly (1965)

According to Katz and Braly (1965), the main reasons of wars lie in economic, value and power factors.

- a. Economic reasons are seen as being of great importance. Poverty, lack of basic commodities necessary to satisfy daily human needs all give rise to dissatisfaction, which in turn may lead to hostility and overt conflict. In fact, looking at the world situation at the moment one can find arguments to support this theory: interstate conflict is more widespread in underdeveloped and poor countries, rather than the developed and wealthy ones. Kosovo for example, was the poorest region of the whole of Yugoslavia, and tax payers from other Republics were sending the monetary contribution to it to try and improve its standard of living.
- b. Another issue over which conflicts arise are differences in values. Value type conflict is based on incompatible reference, principles or practices, in areas such as culture, religion, politics or ideology. It is hard to make compromises in such types of conflicts because such beliefs lie at the core of people's identities. In a way this type of conflict is similar to Argyle's 'ideology' type of war. In Kosovo, differences exist in language, culture and religion, to name just some of the most apparent ones and it could be that some of the causes of wars are attributable to these factors.
- c. Power conflict on the other hand is described as arising over a wish for each party to maximise its influence over the other, and as such is connected to issues of pride and recognition. This type of conflict in Katz and Braly's opinion is particularly prone to escalation and typically ends with victory of one party and capitulation by the other. One can find arguments to support this type of reason for conflict in Kosovo too, since both Serbs and Albanians wished (and still wish) to maximise their influence and achieve greater power and security for their own group.

It seems that one can find arguments to support all of the above-mentioned reasons for conflict in Kosovo, which simply highlights the depth and pervasiveness of conflict into various aspects of life. Finding *the* main reason would be hard and is not as important for this study as is the recognition and complexity that this conflict involves. It is also important to keep in mind that there are countries that are poor, with various cultural, religious and ideological differences, yet no open, violent conflict exists. The above mentioned categories are not intended to *predict* in what countries it is likely to occur, but rather to give an overview of the reasons over which different conflicts *might* start.

Conflict and Basic Needs

Rather than focusing on reasons based on interests and resources, Galtung (1994) argues that basic needs are at the core of every violent conflict. Basic needs can be classified in various ways, one of the most known theories being Maslow's hierarchy of basic needs. It proposes that there are five main classes of needs that build on each other: physiological; safety; belongingness and love; esteem; and self actualisation or metaneeds. He argues that certain basic needs ought to be fulfilled before other needs can be yearned for and fulfilled. The hierarchy starts with the most basic physiological needs and when these are at least partly satisfied, then safety needs can be felt, followed by belongingness and love, esteem and self actualisation or the metaneeds, as the highest human need (Maslow, 1954). According to this theory, physiological needs refer to essential bodily requirements for items such as food and water. In some countries, conflicts do arise over such resources; however in Kosovo, lack of electricity and/or water seems to be the side effect, a result, rather than a cause of war. Generally conflict seems to arise over higher needs that are not met. One of them is a safety need, which refers to the person's need for security, stability and freedom from fear and anxiety. Albanians lacked this type of security mostly during the years of 1997 to 1999, while since 1999; Serbs are the ones lacking basic security. When physiological and safety needs are fairly well met, then a need for belongingness and love will gain prominence. People need to feel that they belong somewhere and if this were extrapolated to the societal level, it would refer to the fact that people need to feel they belong or have a particular status within their own country. Both Albanians and Serbs fear that if the province belongs to or is ruled by the members of the 'other' group, then their own group will lose status and influence in the region. Esteem needs are the next group that becomes central when other, lower needs are at least partially satisfied. They refer to person's needs for respect, dignity and appreciation. One can hear both Serbs and Albanians giving statements which reflect their longing to be respected and appreciated by the other side. The highest level of needs is a need for self-actualisation, describing one's need to develop and make use of the capacities and talents the person has. Currently in Kosovo, there are so many other needs that are not being met, that there is just a small privileged group of people who can dedicate themselves to working on their own self-betterment. The majority of the population is unfortunately occupied with day to day worries over security and survival issues, unemployment and monetary hardships, so it could be argued that they can hardly afford to think about their own higher needs.

If this theory were used to explain the likelihood of conflict, one would expect that lack of fulfilment of the most basic needs such as physiological ones would have the highest chance of leading to violence since it is the most basic, most essential need of all. The higher up in the hierarchy one went, lack of satisfaction of those needs would be less likely to stir up a conflict, since they would not be as 'basic', as essential as the other, lower ones. In Kosovo, throughout the decades many of the needs were being met only for one group and not for the other at any given time. There were times when neither side had the needs satisfied. At such times one group would blame the other group for the bad situation. The level of needs which were not being satisfied were the very similar for both groups at various periods of time.

Another prominent classification of basic needs worth mentioning for this study is by Galtung (1994), who groups them into four categories: survival, well-being, identity and freedom.

a. Survival needs refer to one's need for protection against individual or collective violence, regardless of one's ethnicity. This was not the case in Kosovo, since personal security or insecurity was and still is dependent on one's ethnicity. For example, during the time when the Serbs dominated, Albanians felt threatened and insecure, while when the Albanians dominated in the region, Serbs felt insecure. Unfortunately, for a while now, there has been no period of time when both sides could feel equally protected, regardless of who was in charge of the region.

b. Well-being needs refer to one's need for nutrition, water, movement and protection against illness. This need has not been fully satisfied for either sides throughout the past and is not being met at the moment, but it does not seem to be the focus of problems, since most people still manage to have their basic needs for food, water and access to medicine fairly well satisfied. The exceptions are some mostly Serb populated villages, which were without electricity for months in year 2005 and whose situation was quite grave. Both survival and well being needs can be grouped together as 'material' needs, since both of them require some physical, material component in order to be satisfied.

c. Identity needs refer to a need for self-expression, happiness, affection, self-actualization, social transparency, belonging, and a sense of purpose. In Kosovo, the need for self-expression is greatly limited for Serbs at the moment and represents a reversal of roles from the previous Milošević regime, when the need for self-expression by Albanians had been suppressed. The reason for not allowing people to express their identity is to make them appear subservient to the dominant, 'ruling' group at the time, and to make the other group dominate even in such terms as expression of one's culture and identity.

d. Freedom needs refer to the person's need to make decisions concerning one's way of living, choice of places being able to visit, freedom to choose one's occupation and being able to receive as well as express information and opinion. One could argue that this need is the most jeopardized of all the needs, since individuals' freedom of movement is severely restricted to the areas where their own ethnic group constitutes a majority of the population. In practical terms, this means that in certain areas of Kosovo people need the escort of KFOR if they wish to move from one area to another and at times cannot go farther than their own little village. A person's identity and freedom needs are said to be non-material, since they do not require any material components in order to be satisfied.

Unlike Maslow's hierarchy, these needs are considered to be equally important and do not take preference over another. According to Galtung (1994), no single need is more important, more 'basic' than the other. If one of the needs is not being met over a considerable amount of time, some other ones may be sacrificed in order to obtain that one. For example, repressed identity needs may become so important that survival may be sacrificed during the struggle for identity recognition. The basic Galtung's assumption is that as long as one's basic needs are not being met, conflict will continue. If peace is to be achieved, basic needs of all the people living in the area must be met. No single basic need can be sacrificed at the expense of having other needs met. Contrary to some widely spread beliefs, it *is* possible to have basic needs of every group satisfied. There is more than one way of satisfying the needs

fought over, but the common mistake is that the peoples and politicians usually stick to only *one* acceptable solution to satisfying their need. For example, some people in Kosovo tend to believe that the only way of satisfying their security needs is if they are ruled by their own ethnic group. However, this is not necessarily so. If a rule of law and respect for human rights were established in the region, it would be completely irrelevant for their own security who would rule the region, since regardless of ethnicity, their rights and security would be protected. However, in order to arrive at such sustainable solutions and transform the conflict non-violently, it requires openness to change on the side of the conflicting parties.

One cannot really say which one of the two theories is 'right', since they are looking at basic needs with a different purpose in mind. Maslow's hierarchy mostly explains people's everyday satisfaction of basic needs hierarchy, while Galtung's is geared more specifically to the situations of conflict. There are situations that could be used as evidence to support both the existence of hierarchy (such as when due to lack of satisfaction of physiological needs such as hunger one cannot concentrate on anything else), and against it, such as when a person goes on a hunger strike in order to fulfil a higher need. Therefore, both theories are valuable and worth knowing of, since they give similar, yet slightly different views on basic needs, both of which can be used to explain certain situations of human behaviour when basic needs are not satisfied.

The reasons over which the conflicts occur greatly influence and determine the goals of the conflict. Therefore, the deepest reason and need over which the conflict arises will be fought most vigorously for. According to Rothman (1997), conflicts that are fought most vigorously and with the most intensity tend to be ethnic conflicts, which centre on identity and therefore are often resistant to resolution. According to the same author, collective identity conflicts are often rooted in perception of threat to dignity, recognition, safety, control, purpose and efficacy. When this happens and the group feels disregarded by the majority they react by fighting for autonomy or independence. Although conflicts are rarely solely between two parties, they are frequently described as taking place between only two opposing parties. For example in Kosovo, conflict is generally perceived as taking place between Serbs and Albanians. Although these two groups may be the main actors, there are inevitably other groups such as the international community with UNMIK and KFOR forces and other ethnic groups living in Kosovo, who also play a role. So why is it that the majority of the population refers to the conflict as being between two sides? Horowitz (1985) seems to offer an explanation by arguing that "it is dangerous to have multiple enemies and more efficient to concentrate on the main problem" (p.182). Therefore, according to this explanation, although Serbs or Albanians may have other actors they dislike in the conflict such as the international community, they will most likely try not to make enemies of them and will concentrate on each other as the main enemies.

Some conflicts also have their roots in history, and keep on perpetuating themselves due to unresolved grievances from the past. For example, in Yugoslavia although everyone was living under the official slogan of 'brotherhood and unity', at home, some people would still be talking about grievances from previous wars. According to Vučo (2001), the message of the storytellers was to "never believe the neighbours and be prepared for anything" (p.153, free translation).

The media and the propaganda machine are also thought to have their role both during the preparation for war when they aim to mobilise people as well as during the

war itself. The stories chosen to be emitted, the persons shown, interviews, angles taken, all give it a twist and add to the subjectivity. Objectivity is not the only problem. The issue is that the ownership of the media as well as various political and other prominent persons and organisations may have a vested interest; especially during the big political events, such as wars. The role of the media and its effect during the Yugoslav conflicts cannot be neglected. Most of the media was state owned and controlled by the regime, while the few private media such as B92 were constantly being threatened and blackmailed, not given licences, closed down etc. Milošević used the media to influence and shape the public opinion according to the way it suited him (Tompson, 2000). Rarely were there the reports of one's own nations' atrocities. Most of the media houses focused on portraying only the losses of one's own nation and demonising the other side. This was so in all the republics, with slight variations in degree of one-sidedness. In general, the effect the media has on people depends on the character and susceptibility of the viewer, the source of the information as well as the nature of the information (Money-Kirley, 2001). However, the easiest and quickest mobiliser is fear and this is exactly what was being done: the opponent was always portrayed as dangerous and violent, stemming fear and perceived need for defence, which at one point quickly turned into aggression against 'the other'.

In this study the *real* reason for conflict is not as important, as is the *belief* that people hold about the reason for the conflict, because their actions and attitudes are going to be based on their perception of reality. Therefore, not much discussion will be dedicated to the 'reality' and 'real' reasons for the conflict, but rather to the reasons the people choose to rationalise and explain their beliefs.

Chapter Two

Identity, Group Processes and Intergroup Conflict

Identity, National Identity and the Role of Myths

When we are asked to define who we are and give a description of ourselves, a number of answers start coming up, including some of the following: our gender, age, profession, religious belief, nationality, our family relations, description of personality traits and many others. By simply answering these two questions, even without perhaps being consciously aware of it, we have revealed parts of our personal as well as our social identity. One may ask what the difference between the personal and social identity is. Personal identity is a term used to define who we are and includes our qualities and personality traits, however when in the description we use a relational term we enter into a realm of social identity. Social identity is therefore a more specific subset of the phenomenon called identity (Jussim, Ashmore & Wilder, 2001). It is a part of our identity that includes knowledge of a membership to a particular group and the value and importance attached to that membership (Tajfel, 1981). Belonging to a specific group is frequently an important piece of information in the process of impression formation about a particular individual (Havelka, 2001). Perception of groups is not formed only on the basis of their physical appearance, but also on their socio-psychological characteristics, which are based on beliefs and assessments that were formed through social learning processes and socialization. It is interesting to know what it is that influences our choice of member roles when relating to another person. One of the answers to these questions is given by Brown (1991) who argues that during the times of crisis collective images of group members and identification with one's group become more relevant. We have a number of possible collective identities that we can identify with simultaneously; however the cultural types of collective identities exert a special power. They include religious beliefs, identification with ethnic community and nationality and these have a stronger influence than some other collective identities, such as gender or class. This is due to the fact that cultural elements with which these communities have been formed are stronger than the shared needs and interests that characterise other kinds of collective identity (Smith, 1995).

National identity is one of the possible group identities and as other social identities, varies in strength from one individual to another. National feeling is not inborn although it frequently becomes an important aspect of one's personality (Rot, 2003). Nation is perceived to be able to fulfil many important personal goals, primarily the one of fulfilling existential needs. Through identification with the nation, various needs can be satisfied: esteem needs, security needs, ability to express aggressiveness and hostility and others. Since national country is the strongest institution of all, it is often the strongest object of identification (Rot, 2003).

It is important to make a distinction between national feeling and nationalism. There are many definitions of nationalism, but here just one will be given, the one that defines the concept through socio-psychological terms. According to Trebješanin (1995), "nationalism is a system of values, value orientations, attitudes, ethnical prejudices and stereotypes whose core is the glorification of one's own nation at the expense of others"(p. 92, free translation). The author also states that at the basis of

every nationalistic feeling on the other hand lie positive ethnic prejudices of one's own, and negative prejudices of the other groups. Some of the processes leading to nationalistic beliefs and behaviour involved include feelings of aggression, which are suppressed and projected on the 'other' group and then the aggression that follows is explained as being responsive to the aggression from the 'other' and is therefore very 'legitimate' and 'normal'. Some of the personality traits characteristic for nationalists include dichotomous thinking, insecurity, inferiority feelings, strong displaced aggression and powerlessness. One tries to compensate for these inferiority feelings through over-identification with one's own nation.

One of the ways in which our cultural identity is formed is through the telling and remembering of stories, called myths, that are usually passed through one or more of the following channels: family, society, school and religion (Mertus, 1999). These stories are often used as a model to explain various social activities. They provide a framework that allows the individual to ascribe a meaning to his or her experiences and are frequently used to uncover the inner sources of strength by hearing the heroic stories of one's own kind. According to Rot (2003) for these people myths really exist and determine their destiny, they do not question its validity or truthfulness. Furthermore, myths and experiences retold are much more influential and persuasive than the factual truth and unfortunately sometimes they promote negative stereotypes of other groups (Cohen, 1997). Important sources of knowledge, as well as of some national myths are the school books. According to Simonović (1994), Serbian primary school textbooks for history are full of xenophobic beliefs and hatred towards the neighbouring nations. Such ideas are bound to have an effect on the youth and subsequently on the culture of one's nation. Such books should be revisited if one is to have a culture of peace, rather than war, dominating in Serbia.

One of the events in Serbian history that gained so much attention that is now practically a myth is the Battle of Kosovo in 1389. In fact, Bieber (2002) argues that the Battle of Kosovo is the fundamental mythical moment in the Serbian national past. It is an event that every generation learns about by means of folk epics through Serbian literature and history books at school and at home and is present so much that one sometimes forgets that the event happened over 600 years ago and not in the recent past. This is so due to the effect of myths, since "they eliminate the historical separation between past and present by contemporizing the past or historicising the present..." (Bieber, 2002, p.98). According to Halpern and Kerwesky-Halpern (1972), the Battle of Kosovo is linked to the same traditions as those of Homer. Although Serbs lost the battle, out of defeat they created an oral literature which was essential in keeping the national consciousness during the Ottoman rule. The Battle of Kosovo is also closely linked to religion, since on the eve of the battle; Knez Lazar chose a heavenly life over the earthly one.

Religion frequently represents an important belief for the people and as such may play an important role in determining ones' actions and beliefs. According to Pavićević (1980), religion has three main functions: providing answers to some essential questions, offering consolation and hope and by its moral and ethical requests it contributes to preservation of moral standards and preservation of society as such. Furthermore religion has the function of satisfying various human motives, so at times it is used for justifying non-social and antisocial impulses, like for example

when by believing that one's own faith and religion are the only true and real ones, it might support intolerance of those who do not hold the same religious beliefs.

Group Formation and Group Dynamics during Conflict

An important question related to group processes is about the mechanism of conflict development and the processes used to create outgroup hostility. When people perceive themselves as members of a particular group, the phenomenon that frequently takes place is identification with and attachment to one's own group and antagonism to the 'other' group, people not belonging to that particular group. When this division takes place based on ethnicity, it is referred to as ethnocentrism. The term was coined at the beginning of the twentieth century by Sumner in 1906. Ethnocentrism is also marked by a belief in superiority of one's own culture in comparison to others'. In order for a person to arrive at the stage of ethnocentrism, a number of steps need to take place (Brewer, 2001):

- a. Social categorisation. It involves subdivision of people in discrete groups and accentuation of perceived similarities with the members of the ingroup and differences of the outgroup members. Categorisation is a result of a need for cognitive simplification, because it is impossible for our mind to look at every person, item or idea without any categorisation. It would create cognitive overload and it is for this reason that stereotypical representations (prototypes) are formed.
- b. Social identification and ingroup positivity. Social identification is more than a mere membership of a group; it represents the degree to which the ingroup has been incorporated in the sense of self and a tendency of ingroup positivity may arise out of a need to enhance one's own self-esteem. Brewer (1991) in his optimal distinctiveness theory also specifies two other powerful motives: need for inclusion, motivating an individual to be part of a larger social group, and need for differentiation, which is a need to distinguish self from others. Therefore, identifying oneself with a particular group satisfies both motives: being part of a group satisfies the need for inclusion, and at the same time fulfils the need for distinctiveness, which is achieved by intergroup comparison.
- c. Intergroup comparison. It arises when there is uncertainty about one's standing on some position, which can be resolved by comparing one's own viewpoint to the relevant others. Freud (1930) coined the term narcissism of small differences, which postulates that the more the groups are similar, the stronger the intergroup social competition becomes. Furthermore, Vučo (2001) adds that the customs most disliked in other cultures are related to eating habits, hygiene and sexual behaviour. It is these rituals, specific for each culture, that target one's narcissism and make one unconsciously feel frustrated and helpless. Therefore, having two nations with different rituals living next to each other is likely to produce mockery of each other's different customs. A comparison between groups does not necessarily have to be competitive, but it turns so if the evaluation is *relative*. This means that if the other is judged better, one's own self-evaluation is worse. If the evaluation is done on a single dimension that both groups regard as important, then the comparative appraisal is competitive.
- d. Outgroup hostility. It may arise out of a need to protect or enhance the ingroup. In order for a hostility to turn into aggression, the values and goals of the outgroup need to be seen as threatening the existence of the ingroup. Perceived threat is often symbolic and subjective and overt conflict is usually the product of earlier antagonism rather than its cause.

The above analysis is highly similar to the Social Identity Theory proposed by Tajfel and Turner (1986), one of the cornerstone theories of social identity, which focuses on categorisation, identification and comparison. Therefore, the only difference between the ethnocentrism and social identity is the presence of outgroup hostility. What would be important to know is under what circumstances when one's identity or possessions are threatened does hostility emerge? One can be a member of a group (categorisation), can identify with one's own group (identification) and can compare one's own group to other groups (comparison), without necessarily turning hostile to the other group. There needs to be a trigger, and the trigger on an individual level, as seen above, is usually the perception of threat from the other group and the subsequent use of stereotypes and myths to justify their position. According to Sherif and Sherif (1969), the critical variable is the kind of environment and the norms the groups generate and accept that would determine if groups will turn hostile to one another. Horowitz (1985) postulates that without feelings of antipathy there can be no ethnic conflict. Therefore, there are various triggers and reasons for conflict, including stereotypes, prejudice, antipathy, hostility and perceived threat and it is a number of these feelings and beliefs that need to be present along with certain circumstances for overt conflict to occur. Furthermore, there can be various factors such as the media, religious groups, and various organizations which only exacerbate problems and fuel the conflict. However, on a more global level, various authors argue that the triggers promoting such stereotypes and biases arise due to the fact that there is cultural discrimination, political inequality, weak state, economic problems (Brown, 2001) as well as a competition for scarce resources that gives rise to greed among the parties (Collier, 2000). Since the paper focuses on individuals and small groups rather than the state, what follows is a theory of Relative Deprivation, which attempts to explain in general terms the psychological processes and conditions under which a conflict is likely to occur. The theory was put forward by Gaskell and Smith (1984) and is based on the following main premises:

- a. The person is lacking something. In the case of Kosovo, both Serbs and Albanians were lacking a number of things at various points in time, ranging from employment, monetary difficulties to power positions in the region. They both had certain things missing in their daily lives.
- b. The person sees someone else having that something. The situation in Kosovo was such that either one or the other group was privileged to have things which the other group was lacking. So for example, when the Serbs were in power positions, Albanians had no access to it. The same is for the employment: when Serbs had high employment rate, Albanians were mostly unemployed. At the moment, all of the above mentioned are reversed: Serb positions in power are miniscule, and also is their employment.
- c. The person wants to have that something. Both Serbs and Albanians wished to be in power, be employed and have reasonable pay to live on. They both thought that things which were lacking were valuable and desirable to have.
- d. The person sees it as feasible that he or she should have that something. Both sides thought they deserved to have that which was lacking and was in the hands of the 'other' side. Furthermore, they saw no other reasons apart from their ethnicity which was preventing them from having that something, whether it was employment itself or being in high ranking positions in various firms and municipalities.

This discrepancy gave rise to hostility towards the other group and created fertile ground for potential collective actions including violence. This theory explains quite well the development of the conflict and hostility that many persons on both sides feel. There is a lot of bad feeling over the past maltreatment of each group towards the other, and each side sees itself as the victim of the other. Until equality of opportunities is established where both sides will be able, regardless of their ethnicity and the ruling group, to be given what they are entitled to and have qualifications for, according to this theory the potential for violence will stay high. Once the discrepancy diminishes, both sides might be more likely to look at each other with less resentment and more respect.

Description of 'Us' and 'Them' and Presence of Stereotypes and Prejudice

Stereotype is a schema of the personality traits or physical attributes of a class or group of people. It is usually an overgeneralization and represents a minitheory of co-variation: we think that a certain co-variation is detected, which frequently is far less than estimated. Therefore, this means that stereotypical beliefs people have of others are not true, or at least not as true as they believe it to be. Furthermore, in some cases persons are actually not even aware of possessing the stereotypes about a group of people. When stereotypes are used, they are generally referring to the 'whole' population or 'the vast majority', whereas in fact the truth is that perhaps only 'some of' the people from the stereotyped population have those characteristics. One may argue that stereotypes are based on previous experience and that might be partly true, however if it refers to every single individual of the group, we know that it is not true. If on the other hand, persons hold some beliefs and are ready to acknowledge variability in the group and change their views in the light of new evidence, then it could be argued that their views are mostly based on frequency of occurrence and its probability (Havelka, 2001). One other characteristic of stereotypes is that they tend to be resistant to change despite the factual information that is received which contradicts the stereotypical belief. Rot (2003) claims that similar perceptions of nations' characteristics seem to be resistant to the passage of time and exist through a number of generations.

Ethnic stereotypes refer to the cognitive components in relating to other nations and ethnic groups, which like stereotypes, are usually characterized by simplicity and rigidity of thinking (Rot, 2003). They are generally rigid, because they are filled with strong emotions. Stereotypes can refer to both positive and negative attributes towards a particular ethnic group. For example, there is a stereotype that Serbs are a very welcoming nation, good hosts and very friendly. This represents a stereotypical belief, but a positive one. The same mechanisms, persistence and strength apply to both positive and negative stereotypes.

According to Havelka (2001), numerous studies show that ethnic stereotypes are an important component of interethnic beliefs and influence the potential social interaction with members of that particular ethnic group. Stereotypes gain in strength and prominence at the time of the open conflict, since they aid the mechanism of differentiation amongst 'us' and 'them'. When doing such research on stereotypes, the following conclusions are taken regarding the strength and widespreadness of stereotypes: the greater the agreement on the characteristics of a particular group, the more widespread the stereotype is and the smaller the number of characteristics on which persons generally agree, the more prominent the stereotype (Katz & Braly, 1965).

According to Rot (2003) there are two main functions of stereotypes: the first one being generalisation, which is useful since it allows for cognitive simplification and the second function being an excuse for our views towards certain groups of people, i.e. the rationalisation of our negative views. As already mentioned, stereotypes are a natural phenomena that occur due to the need for a cognitive simplification. Stereotypes as such may not be bad, but it is the way they are used and how flexible one is about them that is important. Stereotypes are particularly problematic when they take the dominant role in negative evaluation of the other group and aid the creation of the enemy image. An enemy is an individual or a group of people seen as ready to hurt us and we feel a need to defend ourselves against such a threat

(Eckhard, 1991). The problem is, that very often we tend to find what we expect, the so-called self-fulfilling prophecy. So if we expect the enemy to threaten us, we will interpret the facts and actions in this manner, distorting the reality. Sometimes the threat may be real, but very often it is imagined, and when this fear is spread via the mass media, the paranoid circle begins. Groups start fearing each other and ascribing all the negative attributes to the 'enemy' group, while most often the 'enemy' group does the same for the other group. During this process the stereotype of the enemy group may become so strong that it may no longer seem human (Bernard, Ottenberg and Redl, 1973). It is only when the enemy is dehumanised that it makes it easier for one's conscience to approve the aggressive acts and infliction of pain on another human being (Vučo, 2001).

Prejudices could be seen as arising from negative stereotypes of a particular group in question. Similarly like stereotypes, they are based on irrationality and frequently contain strong emotional components. For nationalists, positive ethnical prejudices towards one's own group are marked by lack of criticism, admiration of everything that belongs or symbolises one's own nation and according to their beliefs, makes it exceptional (Trebješanin, 1995). One of the functions of prejudice is to allow for discharge of hostility and by doing so reduces anxiety (Horowitz, 1985).

Once the division of the society takes place into ingroup and outgroup, various other processes take place. Some of the questions that arise are the following: how is the ingroup perceived as compared to the outgroup in terms of homogeneity, which group is seen as more heterogeneous, ingroup or the outgroup? One also asks how are the positive and negative behaviours of ingroup and outgroup members perceived? Is the behaviour seen as being due to internal traits of group members or due to situational factors? The answers to such questions are offered in social psychology, which examines these issues in detail.

According to the premise of the Relative Homogeneity Effect, members of the ingroup are seen as more different and varied than the members of the outgroup (Lee and Ottati, 1993). Therefore, perceptions of Serbs by the participants in this study should be seen as more diverse than the perception of Albanians. So why is it that the ingroup members are seen as more different than the outgroup members? One possible explanation could be the rigidity of thinking due to stereotyping of the 'other'. Another possible explanation is given by the Familiarity hypothesis, which argues that our perceptions are based on the amount of information we have about ingroup and outgroup members (Linville, Fischer and Salovey, 1989). Considering that one generally knows more members of the ingroup, interacts more frequently with them, it follows that the person becomes more aware of the differences among them. Since members of the outgroup are generally less well known, they are more likely to be seen in a more global and less differentiated manner. If the Familiarity hypothesis is confirmed in this study, then participants from Kosovo should see more difference in describing Albanians, than their counterparts from Serbia, who did not have that much contact with them and are therefore less familiar with Albanians.

Question of attributing the origins of the groups' behaviour is discussed by the Ultimate Attribution error put forward by Pettigrew (1979), who explains that there is a tendency to attribute bad outgroup and good ingroup behaviour to internal characteristics and to attribute good outgroup and bad ingroup behaviour to external, situational factors. In practical terms this means that anything bad Albanians do, would be explained to as due to their character; while their good behaviour would be

attributed to be due to the situational factors. Likewise, anything bad Serbs did would be explained to be due to the situation, not due to the internal characteristics, while anything bad would be explained as being due to external factors.

Perception of Albanians

Inevitably, every perception is based on a subjective reality, which to a greater or lesser extent truly depicts reality. As such, it is very susceptible to the effects of stereotypes and may breed prejudice if stereotypes are very negative and if the group in question is perceived as potentially dangerous and threatening to one's own group. Since this paper deals with the Serbian implicit culture, only the views of Albanians by Serbs will be analyzed. The views written below do not reflect the personal opinions of the author, nor are they meant to represent the genuine description of Albanians. Rather, they provide a brief overview of the perceptions of Albanians that can frequently be heard in cafes, in the media, on public transport or read in the newspapers and books.

According to Milosavljević (2002), it is unquestionable that of all the neighbouring nations, Albanians are the least liked. Some of the main stereotypes heard are that Albanians hate Serbs, that Albanians are actually converted Serbs and that Albanians cannot rule themselves. Furthermore, Milosavljević (2002) mentions various instances in Serbian literature where Albanians are described as innately aggressive and violent, whose aim is to wipe out the Serbs and take over the Kosovo territory. Many writers also claim that Serbs have been in Kosovo long before Albanians and do not accept any claims suggesting the existence of Albanians or their predecessors in Kosovo before Serbs. High birth rate is also seen as systematically planned in order to outnumber the Serbs and take over the territory in that way. For example, Jevtić (1992) also claims that Albanians as children already carry the hatred for the Serbs and Orthodoxy by being indoctrinated from an early age by their parents and teachers. The tribal and Muslim spirit are also seen to be at the core of such feelings.

One can frequently hear arguments that most of the surrounding Muslim people are actually Serbs, who during the Ottoman Empire converted from Orthodox Christianity into Islam in order to receive benefits from the Turkish rulers (Magaš, 1993). Although it is true that some people were converted to ameliorate their living standards, or to simply survive, claiming that *all* the Muslims in the region are converted Serbs might be taking it a bit too far. Furthermore, even if it were true that all Muslims are actually Serbs, having such negative views towards them does not really make much sense nor is there any logic in finding apparent great differences among the nations, who are claimed to be 'the same', i.e. originating from the same nation (in this case, claiming to be from the Serb origin). According to Vučo (2001), there are two streams of national feelings: tendency to believe that the neighbouring nations originate from the chosen nation and that they accepted the other religion out of spite and hatred; and the other is the tendency to accuse the other nation of hiding its origins, which actually have their roots in the chosen nation.

Another common stereotype is that Albanians are unable to rule themselves. The stereotypical belief is that Serbs are the ones who can lead the country better and Albanians should therefore be assimilated with Serbs, accepting the Serbian customs

and rule (Banac, 1992). In a way, Serbs would then be doing them a 'favour', ruling the country for them. From this belief it seems obvious that Albanians and Serbs somehow are not perceived to be on the same level: Albanians are more 'tribal' and backward compared to Serbs, and the two therefore cannot be 'the same' in any way. Furthermore there is a claim that Albanians are less educated and less intelligent than the Serbs. Origins of this stereotype could be found in the experiences that the general population of Serbia had with Albanians. Due to the difficult economic situation during the 1960's and 1970's, Albanians were coming to Serbia to work as manual workers and it is only in this setting that the Serbs had a chance to meet them. The problem which created this stereotype is the fact that there was no other contact between these two nations (Anastasijević, 2004). This lack of contact also makes people very easily manipulated by untruthful statistical reports of violence and makes it easier for them to believe in the 'barbarity' and 'primitiveness' of the other.

Besides these general beliefs, there are also some stereotypes present related to the description of an individual character and physical appearance of Albanians. In general, they are thought to be very religious and very rigid in their thinking, allowing their rulers or the spiritual leaders to decide for them, rather than thinking with their own heads. Some physical characteristics frequently given by various Serbian writers are: skinny, with sharp facial lines (Milosavljević, 2002). Some positive stereotypes pertain to the following beliefs: Albanians are good hosts, loyal, good neighbours and hard-working.

Such beliefs affect the interaction and communication with members of the discriminated group and may in a way encourage the person to act in ways that would confirm the stereotype, since we tend to accept and remember information which fits our belief system and disregard those which seem to dispute it.

Perception of 'us', Serbs

Perception of one's own nation is likely to be influenced by a degree of strength between a personal and national identity. If one's own identity is largely based on national identity, the chances are that the person will see his or her nation in a much more positive light than one whose personal identity is mostly based on other social identities. Therefore, the perception and strength of the feeling is bound to vary among individuals. Some of the commonly heard phrases about Serbs by Serbs in everyday communication are: "Serbs are a heavenly nation", "Serbs always fight for the right cause", "Serbs never attack, they only defend what is theirs" and so on. Some of these views will be elaborated in more detail below. It is important to keep in mind that these phrases, although commonly heard and written, embraced and criticized, should not be taken as reflecting 'the truth' about Serbs nor as being indicative of the author's personal beliefs.

One of the premises is that Serbs fight for the right cause. It originates from the history that is being taught, since Serbs have always been on the 'right' side: they resisted and struggled against the Turkish invasion, fought bravely during WWI on the side of allies and against German, Italian and other occupiers during WWII. For example, in Serbian history books for primary school, the dominant idea is that all 'our' wars were just and that they were purely wars of liberation, not of invasion (Simonović, 1994). Similar is the belief that Serbs never expelled anyone from their

territory on the basis of nationality or religious beliefs and that they only defended their territory and what is theirs. The thinking expressed in school books is also confirmed by some other Serbian authors. For example, a similar view is expressed by Zurovac (1997), who argues that Serbs never engaged in aggressive and conquering wars, but have fought vigorously and bravely in defending their own freedom. This is precisely how Croatian, Bosnian and Kosovo conflicts were being portrayed in the local media. What is striking is the fact that the media at the time portrayed the reality in exclusively black and white terms, having Serbs always depicted as victims, never as perpetrators. This had a political dimension to it: the aim was to get public support and to mobilise people to fight the wars. At the same time the foreign, media whose objectivity and vested interests are also disputable, showed exactly the opposite picture.

The idea of Serbs being non-invaders is further supported by religious history: Serbian Orthodoxy is claimed to be a religion that never attempted to forcefully convert other people to it, unlike Catholicism and Islam. However, the church has at times been utilized and manipulated into serving certain political ideas.

Epic literature also plays an important role in the literature studied at schools. The fact that children from a young age read and hear a lot about the stories related to the Kosovo cycle makes them very aware of the role Kosovo played in the past and makes them conclude that the region is crucial for the Serbian culture. For example, one of the main characters in the epic songs is Kraljević Marko, who possesses qualities such as strength, sharp mind, determination and courage. He bravely fights and opposes the Turks (who, in the case of Kosovo are frequently identified as being the same as Albanians, due to shared religion). Through the songs, it is 'learnt' that Kosovo cannot be ruled jointly, both by Turks and Serbs (i.e. in today's terms Albanians and Serbs) that Serbs would never surrender and give up Kosovo. Such thinking was also seen during the NATO 1999 bombing, which lasted far longer than the NATO Alliance expected. Pride, resistance and spite are some of the characteristics of the Serbian deep culture, which rarely works to one's advantage when the cost is paid in human lives.

Another strong belief is that Serbs never surrender, that they never bend under the foreign occupier even at the cost of becoming extinct. There is a belief, probably having its roots in the Christianity that Serbs, as Christ, will rise up. Although at certain times Serbs may be oppressed and powerless, the time will come when they will be powerful again. Serbian deep culture is based on the following premise: defeat, retreat, return (J. Galtung, personal communication, May 18, 2004). There is an assumption that no matter how hard and unfair the present situation is, the victory will come in the future.

Serbs are thought to fight bravely and wholeheartedly, regardless of the opponent's strength. All these beliefs are deeply engrained in the majority of population and are then exploited by politicians in order to fulfil their agenda. For example, on the 26th June 1989, exactly 600 years after the Kosovo battle, Milošević gave a speech where he alluded to those qualities in the Serbian nation and vowed to give them support, telling them that no-one would beat them and that if conflict occurred, they would fight bravely and come out as winners (Silber and Little, 1995).

There is also a strong sense of national pride, the reasoning being that Serbs cannot be bribed or lured into any immoral action on a national level. Crucial evidence for such a belief is the fact that Yugoslavia did not support with either USSR or the West during the Cold war and preferred being Non-aligned, although benefits by both parties were being offered.

Some of the positive character traits ascribed to Serbs according to Milosavljević's (2002) analysis of literature include: tolerance, friendliness, forgiveness, bravery, justice, discipline and humaneness. Good sense of humour and pride are also some of the traits ascribed to Serbs. Besides the positive ones, Serbs also see some negative characteristics in their own nation, such as: envy, spite, naivety, inability to agree and form a cohesive structure. The last one is frequently heard as being the main reason why Serbs and Serbia are in such a difficult situation at the moment.

According to a study done by Trebješanin, (1995), youth of Serbia most frequently describe their own nation with the following positive and negative attributes: courage, glory, love for freedom, justice, naivety, betrayal, selfishness, insufficient education and lack of unity. A study by Đurić (1980), carried out on primary school students aged 13 and 14, concluded that for the majority of participants Serbs are brave, cheerful, hardworking and perseverant in their struggle. It would be interesting to see what the young persons of this study have to say about Serbs and see whether their beliefs reflect those from the literature.

Chapter Three

Methodology

The scope of this study was to explore the implicit Serbian culture as reflected by the opinion of youth from Kosovo and Serbia. The study aimed at gaining an insight into the youth's reasoning about the issue of Kosovo and exploring any possible differences that exist between the two groups (youth from Kosovo and youth from Serbia). These two groups were chosen to see if direct experience of the conflict shapes the implicit culture in any way. The research was conducted through semi-structured interviews in Belgrade.

Methodological Choice

This study was based on a qualitative approach, since this type of methodology is most suitable for examination of persons' views, attitudes, feelings and beliefs. The main focus of the study was on persons' own beliefs and perception of reality, rather than on the reality itself and therefore more rigid and statistical types of research were not deemed suitable for the nature of this study. According to Strauss and Corbin (1998), qualitative methods are particularly suitable for examination of the meaning given to particular experiences, which is precisely what is of interest in this study. Furthermore, Silverman (2000) claims that qualitative research is well suited for "...providing a 'deeper' understanding of social phenomena than would be obtained from purely quantitative data" (p.8).

However, besides many of its strongpoints, qualitative research also has some disadvantages. It does not allow for research into cause and effect relationships and fails to provide us with evaluation of significance of the results. Furthermore, some critics doubt the trustworthiness of the explanations offered, since researcher sometimes refer to a few, 'telling' examples, but do not give explanation for the contradictory and less clear data (Silverman, 1989). To minimize the risk of this possible flaw of qualitative research, the author of this study made sure to report and analyse any potential contradictory or unclear data reported by participants. On the whole, weighing the pros and cons of qualitative methods it is believed that for this study, the richness and depth of information gathered outweigh the disadvantages and potential flaws of the method chosen.

Tools

There are various tools used in qualitative research, ranging from questionnaires, interviews and observations, to name a few. For this study, a semi-structured, in-depth interview was chosen as the most appropriate tool. The interviewer had a standard list of open-ended questions to be asked, with a freedom to expand on any particular theme of questions if it was found to be personally important to the interviewee. Allowing for further questions and more detailed elaborations was seen as a very important advantage of this methodological tool, as it allowed for deeper

exploration of issues relevant to the participants and allowed for more complete understanding of their perceptions and experiences.

According to Fajgelj (2004), for interviews it is best if they are conducted directly, with a visual contact, meaning that it is best if the interview is done face to face, rather than by telephone. Furthermore, it is best if there are only the interviewer and the interviewee present, without observers who would be listening to the interview, since the interviewee is more likely to relax and be open and honest in his or her answers if there is no one else listening to the interview.

According to Havelka, Kuzmanović and Popadić (1998), prior to conducting interviews it is crucial that the interviewer presents him or herself and the organization or institutions he or she represents. Following this, a brief overview of the topics covered in the interview needs to be given in order to put the interviewee more at ease and explain roughly what types of questions can be expected during the interview.

Conducting interviews rather than focus groups avoided contamination of data through influences of other person's opinion and allowed one to hear opinions from timid persons who most likely would not have felt free to speak in front of a group. Interviews rather than questionnaires were used, since questionnaires would not allow for such an in-depth explanation of issues.

The interview questions were constructed after extensive literature review on the topic and were largely guided by the lectures by Wilfried Graf and Gudrun Krammer (Personal communication, March 2004) about conflict transformation based on understanding of conflict transformation, understanding assumptions and attitudes, analysis of basic needs, analysis of deep dimensions of basic needs, construction of new attitudes and goals and consolidation of new behaviour. The study was piloted on the first four interviewees. Since no difficulties were encountered, no changes to the interview were made (A copy of the interview questions is provided in Appendix A).

Participants

Participants of this study were 10 young adults (5 male and 5 female) from Belgrade (Serbia) and 10 young adults (5 male and 5 female) from Priština and Prizren (Kosovo), who currently all live in various municipalities of Belgrade. Participants from Kosovo were from Priština (8 of them), which is the capital of the province and 2 of them were from Prizren, another big city in Kosovo. This lowered the risk of having diversity in experience due to differences in the size of the place of living (e.g. rural versus city lifestyle). The majority of participants from Kosovo (8 out of 10) came to Serbia in 1999 either during or after the NATO bombing, while the other two came in 1996 and 1997. This means that all the participants have lived in Kosovo during the time when the tensions were already high, with parallel institutions being established and division of society had already started taking place.

The formal nationality and national identification of interviewees was Serbian, since the study aimed to explore the Serbian implicit culture, therefore no members of other ethnic groups or nations were interviewed. Since the study examined beliefs

and views in relation to Kosovo, the participants were chosen from Kosovo and Serbia, in order to see whether and how the opinions of two groups differ in their views about Kosovo.

Education levels in both groups were similar: 5 participants from each group had already graduated with a University degree, while the other 5 in each group were still University students. The average age in each group was 25, with a mean age for males from Belgrade being 26, for females 24, while for males from Kosovo was 25 and for females 24. Age range for participants from Belgrade was from 24 to 27, and for participants from Kosovo from 21 to 28.

Vast majority of the participants identified themselves as Orthodox Christians: 8 out of 10 from Serbia and 10 out of 10 from Kosovo. The remaining two interviewees from Serbia expressed their belief to be atheist. Participants of this study generally did not elaborate on the amount of influence religion has in their life.

Since it was hard to find participants from Kosovo, the sampling method for the study was a snowball convenience sampling. The participants of the study were recruited through a circle of friends and acquaintances and are therefore very unlikely to be representative of the population. This is not seen as detrimental, since the aim of the research was to give an insight into variety of beliefs, attitudes and feelings present in the society and give a brief overview of the complexity revolving around the issue of Kosovo.

One advantage of such sampling was that it allowed the researcher to get in touch with interviewees easier and increased an amount of trust between the two, since the interviewer was known through the circle of friends and was a trusted source. This also ensured that the participants were more relaxed and at ease, being less timid and suspicious about the nature of the study.

No formal screening of participants and their psychological state were done, but care was taken that those participating were not going through any type of crisis at the time of interview, which was checked through the persons who put the researcher in touch with them.

Procedure

Interviews were conducted during the months of November and December 2004 in Belgrade and were carried out in participants' native language, Serbian. Each interview roughly lasted for 60 minutes and was afterwards transcribed by the researcher herself.

Prior to interviewing the participants, telephone communication was established, when the researcher presented herself, the nature of the study and briefly gave an explanation of what the interview would entail and what topics would be covered. If persons agreed to participate, the date and place for the meeting were set. The interviews were carried out either at the interviewer's home, the participants' home or another place that the participants suggested.

Prior to commencement of the interview, the overview of the research was given once again. Participants were reassured regarding the confidentiality of their answers and were informed that no data that could reveal their identity would be published

without their written agreement. The researcher also asked for their permission to have the interviews recorded, with the assurance that tapes will be erased upon the transcription of the interviews. Following this, the consent form was signed (Appendix B).

At the end of the interview debriefing was provided. Interviewees were asked for their feedback on the experience and a friendly chatting continued, which served as a closure to the experience. According to Havelka, Kuzmanović and Popadić (1998), such questions are crucial for interviewees to experience the interview process as a constructive and complete event. During the feedback time, no negative comments of the experience were received.

Chapter Four

Results and Analysis

Coding Procedure

Grounded theory proposed by Strauss and Corbin, was taken to be the general guide for the analysis of the results of this research. Grounded theory postulates that prior to starting the project the researcher should not have a preconceived theory in mind, but instead would allow the theory to emerge from the data (Strauss & Corbin, 1998). Because this approach relies on deriving theory from data, it is likely to offer insight and enhance understanding of the nature of the subject under investigation, in this case the youth's perception, beliefs and attitudes towards the conflict in Kosovo and the nations involved in the conflict.

One of the ways in which grounded theory can be applied to the analysis of results is by employing the Open coding technique. Open coding is an analytical process through which concepts are identified and their dimensions are discovered from data. It allows one "to see new possibilities in phenomena and classify them in ways that others have not thought of before" (Strauss & Corbin, 1998, p.105). Open coding procedure was applied in the following way. After transcribing the interviews, the researcher read them over and over until some of the issues clearly came out. These issues were termed "keywords" and subsequently each keyword had a quotation from the interview referring to it. Once an exhaustive list of keywords and quotations was obtained, the similar ones were grouped together and were named as "themes". These similar events, feelings or beliefs grouped under themes were then grouped under more abstract concepts termed "categories". Such analysis yielded six separate categories, with three or four themes in them (Table 1).

Table 1: Classification of Keywords Highlighted during the Interviews

CATEGORIES	THEMES	KEYWORDS
(i) Conflict development in the region of Kosovo	a. Origin in time	Throughout history From 1687 Before World War II After World War II During the 1990's
	b. Reasons for conflict	Going on for centuries League of Prizren time (1878) During World War II After Tito's death (1980)
	c. Goals of Serbs and Albanians	Cultural differences Lack of civic rights Political struggle for power Unequal opportunities Albanian wish to take over the territory
		Be part of Serbia with Albanians and other ethnic groups living there Achieve situation of the 1990's To survive Return of IDPs/refugees Greater Albania Ethnic cleansing of Serbs Ethnic cleansing of Albanians
		Secure a Serbian rule To live in peace No concrete goals Independence

	d. Actors in the conflict	International community Albanian politicians Other ethnic groups Religion	Serbian politicians Albanian terrorists Large institutions Media
(ii) Relationship between Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo	a. Through history until 1989	Two separate worlds Tensions present Too much power in hands of Albanians We were all friends, lived well together	Division apparent No problems seen
	b. Years from 1989 until 1997	Parallel institutions No conflict, but lack of contact Too much power in hands of Serbs	Escalation of conflict
	c. Years from 1997 until 1999	Albanian terrorists killing Serbs and disobedient Albanians Serbian police and army maltreating and killing Albanians	
	d. Post 1999 until the present time	KFOR arrival No freedom of movement for minorities Problems with the property	Monasteries destroyed
(iii) Beliefs about the region of Kosovo	a. The territory	Sacred Serbian land Historical & cultural heritage Crucial part of national identity Spiritual and economic richness	Serbian roots Territory not worth dying for Always was part of Serbia
	b. Mistakes in the past	Allowing uncontrolled Albanian immigration after WWII Not allowing Serbs to return after WWII Lack of democracy Behaviour of Serb police and army in the 1990's Not having enough dialogue	Communism
	c. Responsibility/blame	Milosevic Tito Distinctive groups, not nations Serbian government and Albanian groups	Albanian terrorists Politicians in general
	d. Victims	Common people (Serbs and Albanians) Politicians manipulate, people suffer General population	
(iv) Perception of basic needs and requests of Serbs and Albanians as seen by Serbs	a. Basic needs	Should be the same for all Survival needs Lack of security Never satisfied for Serbs and Albanians at the same time	Freedom of movement Freedom of expression
	b. Legitimate requests	To have a normal life Keeping their property Researching mass graves Participation in decision-making	To be able to live in Kosovo Independence
	c. Illegitimate requests	Not taking responsibility for actions during conflict Apartheid regime of 90s To be the absolute power in Kosovo Ethnic cleansing of minorities To keep situation as is now without responsibility for actions during conflict	Independence
(v) Perception of different ethnic groups	a. Serbs	Good people Friendly Lack of national awareness Good hosts Better towards foreigners than to each other Dark, medium height	Welcoming Suffer a lot Defend what's theirs Not united
	b. Albanians	United Very reliable Nationalist feelings strong The same like Serbs from Kosovo Brownish, medium height	Hard working Keep their word Persistent

		Distinctive facial features
	c. Turks, Roma and other minorities	Neutral Refugees Act according to the ruling regime Suffered a lot too Better than Albanians
	d. What Albanians might say about Serbs	Not very good now Bad, based on myth Depends on the type of person and his/her experiences Think only the worst Bad, based on experience
(vi) The future of Kosovo	a. Expected	Division Independent Kosovo Don't know what to expect Fear this conflict will drag on for a long time Kosovo still problem in the future Cantonisation
	b. Ideal	Wish to have contact again with each other Everyone living together Kosovo belongs to Serbia with Albanians staying in Kosovo Too complicated to find one
	c. What should be done	Education Dialogue Too complicated to do it Develop economy Trials for war crimes for all
	d. Lessons learnt	Not to trust politicians Be united and pacifists Not to be led by grand ideas of nationalism War is not an option

Throughout the analysis of results it is useful to keep in mind that the opinions are given by persons who identify themselves as *Serbs* and who come either from Serbia or Kosovo. No Albanians or members of other ethnic groups were included in this study. It would be extremely useful to do a similar study on Albanians and other groups living in Kosovo and compare the results of the two groups.

In this chapter, when no difference in opinions between Serbs from Kosovo and Serbs from Serbia were found, the distinction between the two groups was not made. When the differences were noted, the two groups under study were referred to as 'participants from Serbia' and as 'participants from Kosovo' In order to safeguard the identity of interviewees, any statements that could possibly reveal their identity were omitted or modified, however the meaning of the statement remained the same.

What follows is the presentation of results and their analysis in light of the previous research done.

Conflict Development in the Region of Kosovo

Probably one of the difficulties in the solution of Kosovo conflict lies in its complexity, the length of time conflict has been going on, perceived incompatibilities of goals of the conflicting sides as well as a vast number of actors being directly or indirectly involved in the conflict. The problem also lies in the fact that persons cannot agree on issues related to the conflict, such as when and why it actually started and which actors play what kind of role in the conflict. This is also highlighted in many of the answers below. Related to Kosovo there simply seem to be so many interconnected issues and many different angles from which the situation can be analyzed, that lack of consensus on many issues by participants is not surprising.

Origin in time

Participants found it hard to locate the precise date or year when the conflict started. A few claimed that it dated as far as the Turkish invasion (1389) or from the time of the formation of the Prizren league (1978) and very few saw it as originating in the last decade. Nearly all of the interviewees stated that the conflict had deep historical roots, but were not sure how deep that history went. The vast majority of participants from Serbia found the roots of the conflict to originate from Tito's time and post Second World War time. They said that during those times Albanians from Albania were allowed to settle in Kosovo, while Serbs were not allowed to return back to Kosovo (as they were expelled from there during the Second World War) and those who were living there started slowly moving out.

"I think the division and problems originate in Tito's time. He was purposefully bringing the Albanian population to Kosovo and Serbs were simply moving out as they could not live together with them in a community". (Participant 5; female; from Serbia).

The vast majority of participants from Kosovo on the other hand put the accent on the events happening during the 1980's when the demonstrations by the Albanian population were taking place and when claims for independent Kosovo were being heard. They also emphasized the fact that conflict was present but largely dormant for a very long time. The difference in answers between the two groups of participants could be due to the effect of experience: youth from Kosovo were very young when demonstrations of 1981 were taking place, but perhaps they kept on hearing about it as they were growing up. On the other hand participants from Serbia might have referred to more distant history instead, as that is what was emphasised and heard on the news or was written in the media as the origin of the conflict.

"It dates from a very long time ago, I cannot give an exact date, but surely it has its roots from a long time ago. Roughly it dates from the fall of the communistic thinking and Tito's death [1980]". (Participant 17; male; from Kosovo).

Both groups of participants claimed that origins of conflict could also be traced to the Milošević's time, from 1989 when the autonomy of the province was removed.

"The real armed conflict started in 1998, but the political conflict, which caused the armed one, started in 1989 with the removal of autonomy and with a type of

constitutional putsch which Milošević carried out in 1989". (Participant 6; male; from Serbia).

Both groups of interviewees made a distinction between the dormant and an open stage of conflict. Dormant stage of conflict could be described as having roots in history and originating from the times when there was an apparent peace in the region, but when tensions were already visible. The open stage of conflict, representing only the culmination of the processes boiling for a long time were pinpointed to the years of 1997 and 1998 when open clashes between the Serbian police and Albanians forces had started. Participants' opinions about the times when conflict started partly support Isakovic's (1997) analysis of the conflict. Participants identified years 1981 and 1997/1998 as the time of the conflict escalation, but instead of the year 1968 which the author mentioned, participants opted to go even further into history to the time immediately after the Second World War.

Reasons for conflict

Various reasons for conflict were identified by the participants. Some of the main causes were thought to be the following: fight over the territory, large differences in numbers, human rights dimension, economic reasons and differences between Serbs and Albanians as peoples. Both Katz and Braly's (1965) and Argyle's (1992) explanations of reasons over which conflicts occur found their own supporters among this group of participants, since they referred to issues related to economic, political, value and ideological factors. Interviewees rarely gave only one reason over which conflict started and generally mentioned a few.

Both groups of interviewees gave substantial importance to the conflict being due to the Albanian wish to take over the territory of Kosovo. They claimed that due to large numbers of Albanians they wished to enlarge their territory and spread to the neighbouring countries, including Serbia. This, translated into Argyle's (1992) terms refers to the political factors, and power conflict according to in Katz and Braly's (1965) classification. An interviewee made her point in the following way:

"The fight over territory...I see that everything is because of that. Their [Albanian] tendency to spread because they are so many...they are doing it in Kosovo and Macedonia...they are spreading and have a need for territory and we believe that it is ours...and that's where the problem lies". (Participant 2; female; from Serbia).

Quite a number of participants from Serbia, while none of the interviewees from Kosovo, identified the reason of conflict as being due to cultural differences between Serbs and Albanians. Reasons such as differences in customs, religion and norms were given to support their arguments. Such a view refers to Argyle's (1992) ideological factors and to Katz and Braly's (1965) differences in values factors. This difference between the two groups is quite interesting, because it indicates that cultural differences are seen more as a problem by people who actually never lived with Albanians, than by those who lived with them. It seems to support the idea that what is not known to the people seems more dangerous than that which is known.

A few participants from both groups also identified poverty and lack of jobs as an issue over which conflict started. Most of the persons from Kosovo and very few interviewees from Serbia focused their perception of reasons for conflict on issues of human rights (either as being denied to the Albanians or as being given too much freedom) and on the communist regime.

“They [Albanians] were complaining about their rights, but they had all the rights we had, but that didn’t suit them. I don’t know why”. (Participant 11; female; from Kosovo).

On the whole, reasons over which conflict started could be divided into two groups: as being of material and non-material origin. Material reasons could be taken to refer to tangible issues, such as the territory and density of population and lack of employment, while non-material would include human rights issues and cultural differences between the Serbs and Albanians.

Reasons for conflict are generally pinpointed to the ‘other’ side, i.e. Albanians, and are rarely seen as originating from one’s own side. Brewer’s (1991) and Tajfel and Turner’s (1986) hypotheses about group identification and group positivism were confirmed in this case. Participants identified the ingroup positively in contrast to the outgroup, which was seen to be the reason for conflict. Whether this is a reflection of reality or not is not to be discussed here, since the study is not trying to judge the interviewees’ opinion as being right or wrong, but rather to provide an analysis of their perceptions and possible implications of such thinking. Therefore, the fact that so many participants traced the core reason for conflict to the outgroup, it can mean that they feel Serbs are the victims of this conflict and therefore do not carry the main portion of guilt for the fact that conflict had taken place.

Goals of Serbs and Albanians

Participants identified the goals of Serbs as different from those of Albanians related to Kosovo. This is not a surprising finding, since differences in goals seem to be one of the core reasons why solution is hard to find: each side strives to achieve something which opposes the other side’s goals. This section of results was divided into two sections in order to analyse the interviewee’s perception of Albanian and Serbian goals separately.

a. Perceived goals of Serbs about Kosovo (by Serbs)

Both groups frequently mentioned that the wish of Serbs was for Serbs in Kosovo to stay there, live peacefully, have their human rights respected and allow for internally displaced persons and refugees to return. Both groups also frequently stated that the goals and a wish of Serbs from Kosovo is to have Kosovo part of Serbia and to have a situation very similar to that during the 1990’s when Kosovo was ruled by the Serbs.

“[Serb goals are] just to stay there, to live there and protect what is theirs, their property, their heritage”. (Participant 13; male; from Kosovo).

“The aim is to keep the territory which had been ours for generations; we started our history there in 1389 during the Kosovo battle. We need to keep what is historically ours, because history is an indicator of how worthy you are”. (Participant 3; male; from Serbia).

The answers above, besides stating the goal of Serbs, reveal the participants' opinion that Kosovo is undoubtedly belonging to Serbs. Historical connection seems very strong and is carried over as an important aspect of the present time, which supports Bieber's (2002) view that myths may eliminate the link between the past and the present, making the two closely tied.

The answers between the two groups interviewed differed. The interviewees from Kosovo frequently stated that Serbs from Serbia were not well informed about the situation of Kosovo and did not genuinely care about the people there or simply did not have a clear goal in mind for the province. On the other hand participants from Serbia rarely made referral to that. Many interviewees said that Serbs wanted to keep Kosovo as part of Serbia, but that it was more a game of politicians to score some political points rather than a true reflection of their caring for the region.

“I think that the goals of Serbs are divided among people...to some, Kosovo is very important and some do not really care, because they have other things which are their priority”. (Participant 10; male; from Serbia).

“Serbs from Kosovo want everything to be like during the 1990's. And as for Serbs from Serbia, I do not think that Kosovo is really important to them, they just want to have sovereignty over Kosovo to be able to say that Kosovo is Serbia and that's all”. (Participant 19; male; from Kosovo).

The perceived goals of Serbs related to Kosovo could be classified into two groups: materialistic/territorial ones and humanistic/ quality of life oriented. Both groups were often seen as the goals of Serbs: to have Kosovo as part of Serbia as well as having Serbs (and Albanians) live in Kosovo peacefully. Just a few mentioned that there are people who would want Kosovo to be Albanian free and very few mentioned that it did not really matter whether Kosovo would be part of Serbia as long as people in Kosovo lived well there. On the whole, quite a wide spectrum of Serbian goals was identified, with some participants believing that in general Serbs as a nation and their leading politicians do not really have a clear goal about Kosovo and are acting ad hoc.

b. Perceived goals of Albanians about Kosovo (by Serbs)

All the interviewees were consensual that the goal of Kosovo Albanians was independence, but there was a difference in opinion on the issue whether once independent they would like to keep it as a separate country or to join it to Albania, creating a 'greater Albania'.

“Well, the aim of their politicians and them, since they are supporting those politicians is to join that piece of land to Albania”. (Participant 4; female; from Serbia).

“Their goal is independent Kosovo as a country, without joining it to any other country. Simply, they want it to be an independent country”. (Participant 12; female; from Kosovo).

Some interviewees believed Albanians wished to live in peace with other ethnic groups in Kosovo once it became independent, while some feared they wanted it to be ethnically clean.

The opinions among participants varied on the goals and role of the neighbouring Albania. They either thought Albania is neutral in the conflict, that it does not care that much about Kosovo and that actually Albanians from Albania and Kosovo Albanians do not like each other much. On the other hand, some other participants were adamant in their belief that Albania’s goal is to have Kosovo join its territory.

“I believe they [Albanians from Albania] have a different aim from Albanians from Kosovo. I think they want to join Kosovo to Albania, while Albanians from Kosovo want to stay in good relations with Albania, but be independent of them”. (Participant 7; male; from Serbia).

An interesting observation is that there is greater perceived unity of goals among the Albanians, while there is much greater variability in the perception of Serbian goals. Whether this is a reflection of the true political situation or just a question of perception cannot be said from this study only and further examination into the issue is needed.

Actors in the conflict

Participants identified various actors as having a role in the conflict. They mentioned institutions such as the media, international bodies, religious representatives and various Serbian and Albanian political figures. The role of each of the actors playing a role was also disputed. The following is just a brief summary of the long discussion on the issue.

a. Serbian and Albanian actors

Participants identified both politicians from Serbia and politicians from Kosovo as being actors in the conflict. Opinion on the role of politicians from Serbia was divided, with Milošević largely being blamed for bringing negative consequences, while some others such as Čović (he is currently president of the Coordinating body of Serbia-Montenegro Council of Ministers) were given positive evaluations by some interviewees. In general, Serbian politicians from Kosovo were given better evaluation by both groups of interviewees, since they were seen as sincerely fighting for the benefit of people living in Kosovo, while politicians from Serbia were frequently identified as abusing their positions in their own, personal benefit.

“I believe that the main role was played by Čović since 2000, because he was the coordinator for Kosovo and I think he worked really hard...there are also politicians from Kosovo who are trying to do their best...” (Participant 4; female; from Serbia).

As for the Albanian side, Albanian politicians and the foreign Albanian lobbies were identified as main actors, generally playing a negative role. America was frequently quoted as being their ally and playing a role in the conflict, siding with the Albanian side.

“America is giving Albanians in Kosovo the willpower and motivation for their goal, helps them...they pretended to be some sort of peace keepers there, but they are not”. (Participant 13; male; from Kosovo).

The role of other ethnic groups in this conflict was seen as insignificant by the participants in this study. They were largely seen as neutral or as siding with whichever side was in power. Even when asked about future talks about the status of Kosovo, the participants generally thought that they should not play a big role in the negotiations, but that their rights should definitely be respected. An interesting finding is that besides ‘other’ actors, ones ‘own’ actors were seen in a negative light too. There was no perceived faultlessness by the actors perceived as belonging to the ingroup. This now seems to contradict the finding of Brewer (2001) and Tajfel and Turner (1986) about ingroup positivism, since the participants saw some ingroup actors in a negative light. This finding is not in line with the finding from the previous section entitled ‘Reasons for conflict’, since there in group positivism was seen as taking place. It might be that on the whole the reason for a conflict is seen as mostly being caused by the other side, while the contributing factors for the conflict, such as the politicians of one’s own group were seen as aggravating the situation even further.

b. Role of the international community

The foreign bodies and representatives were identified as playing different roles. Quite a number of interviewees both from Kosovo and Serbia saw most of them as ambivalent, not really knowledgeable enough about the conflict and slow to react when action is needed.

“International community is a conglomerate of countries, which is very slow, does not know how to react adequately and which frequently is not very interested in what is happening there...But they also play a tremendously positive role, as without them there would be war now...and everything is better than the war”. (Participant 6; male; from Serbia).

Besides the ambivalent role, as can be seen from the quote above, some also saw the international community as important actor in keeping the peace in Kosovo. Those same participants thought that actions by the international community outweighed the bad or incompetent things they did.

The third group of opinions centred on the negative role the international group played, since they were seen as misreporting on the real situation in Kosovo, as being subjective and not fully aware of the complexities involved in the Kosovo problem.

“The international community has double standards so to say. On the one hand they say that things are getting better, which they are not, and on the other they

encourage Albanians to continue with their nationalistic ideas. (Participant 16; male; from Kosovo).

Therefore, the international community was seen as ambivalent, positive, negative or a combination of some of the above mentioned influences. The conclusion is that international actors are seen as important in the conflict, but impact of their action is disputed.

c. Role of the religion

The role of the religion was widely discussed by the majority of participants and was an issue they tended to elicit quite strong opinions. Beliefs ranged from religion playing no role, or playing a minor role, to beliefs about religion being one of the main actors in the conflict (both positive and negative).

The vast majority of participants saw religion as being one of the main factors, or an important factor, but not the reason for conflict. Those participants having such opinions were divided on the issue of whether the role it played was positive or negative. Those who saw religion as a positive actor believed it to be a source of spiritual strength which spreads values of respect and tolerance, while those who identified it as a negative actor blamed it for spreading the hatred and nationalism among its population (both referring to Islam and Orthodoxy).

“In Kosovo there is Islam, Orthodox Christianity and Catholicism, so in my opinion religion plays a role in the conflict, but I believe that politics is the main actor in the conflict”. (Participant 7; male; from Serbia).

Some participants also believed in the conspiracy theory, thinking that there is a complex and well organised group of people set to diminish the influence of Serbs and potentially destroy them completely. For example, one such conspiracy theory centred on religion and the participant explained it in the following way:

“I think that religion is playing a role in Kosovo, because nowadays in the world everything is happening against the Orthodox religion. I think that the aim is to eradicate Orthodoxy”. (Participant 11; female; from Kosovo).

Some others gave a different explanation as to why monasteries and religious monuments were being targets of the violence by the Albanian population. They mainly referred to Orthodoxy being a *symbol* of Serbian character, something that they wished to remove from Kosovo, because it reminded them of negative experiences with the Serbs and their dominance in the past.

“Religion definitely plays a positive and important role, but at the moment it is an obstacle in Kosovo, because all the religious monuments such as churches and monasteries are being targets of vandalism, since they represent Serbian identity. (Participant 13; male; from Kosovo).

As usual, the role of the religion cannot be described as having only one effect in the situation. Since its influence varies among people, so does the role it plays. Both positive uses and abuses of religion are possible and have been noted through

history. Perhaps the perceived importance religion is playing in this conflict is tied to the degree it plays a role in one's personal identity definition. Serbia is a secular country, so the religion and politics ought to be separate. However, since the religion was gaining importance since the fall of the communism, its influence in the political arena and the impact of the spiritual leaders on the citizens has grown as well.

d. Media and nongovernmental institutions

Media and nongovernmental organizations were also seen as actors in the conflict. Media was identified by some participants as being subjective and as generally presenting matters in black and white terms. Some also thought it was the media that was spreading and exaggerating the tensions in the region. As one participant said:

"I think that media played an important role in the conflict. When someone talks to you for 24 hours about intolerance, about how Serbs and Albanians are different and how they jeopardize each other...then at the end you start believing it". (Participant 20; female; from Kosovo).

According to Tompson (2000), media was a powerful tool in the hands of the regime, as it was controlling and influencing the opinion of the people. Only in very few regions were there independent media operating. Therefore, their influence could not have been compared to the influence of state owned media. Some participants of this study acknowledged the effect that the media had on the development of the conflict. On the other hand there were also a few participants who thought that 'our' (Serbian) media was more objective than the media of the neighbouring countries and more objective than the international media, since they said various views can be heard on national television. Such a finding may be due to the fact that the participants were from large cities, where independent media could be heard so they thought the media was not so biased.

Nongovernmental institutions working in Kosovo were given mixed views by the participants from Kosovo, while participants from Serbia did not make specific referral to them, either because they were not aware of their specific role or simply because they did not think they were important actors in the conflict. Of the participants from Kosovo who expressed their opinion about nongovernmental organisation, half believed they had a great potential and were doing good things for the people, but the other half thought they were being selfish, working in their own interest or not really knowing how to provide adequate help to the people.

"The majority of foreign, international institutions are just looking for ways to earn money for themselves and become richer. They do not really care about the people". (Participant 11; female; from Kosovo).

Relationship between Serbs and Albanians through Time

The development of conflict and escalation of violence had an effect on the relationship between the two nations in Kosovo. There of course, were exceptions, but generally Serbs and Albanians went through some distinctive phases of type and frequency of relating as time went by. During the first stage, until the removal of autonomy in 1989, no major problems between the two groups were reported, although certain tensions were noted. The next period of time, from 1990 until 1997, the two societies became virtually separate and independent of each other. This period could be described as a period of 'preparation' for an open conflict to occur. The peak of the open conflict was from 1997 until 1999 and right after the end of bombing, when large numbers of Serbs were leaving (in fact all of the participants had fled Kosovo by the end of NATO bombing in 1999). The last phase of the conflict was identified as being from 1999 until the present time. The participants thought that at this stage violence is still present, although it does not represent an acute stage of the conflict and that problem of Kosovo is far from being solved.

Through history until 1989

No differences in opinions were apparent between the participants from Kosovo and Serbia. The vast majority of interviewees expressed belief that through history there were periods of collaboration and good relations between Serbs and Albanians. Some believed that despite the wars between the two nations in the last century, personal relationships were not bad and that the two nations lived well together, helped each other when in need and were actually friends on one to one basis. Many participants from Kosovo said they had Albanian friends in their childhood, until the year 1989 (when Milošević gave his famous speech at Gazimestan, to mark 600 years since the Kosovo battle).

"I think that at one period in time; after the World War II they lived well together. Until 1990's , as a child I had an excellent relationship with Albanians, but since then never again were we friends..." (Participant 11; female; from Kosovo).

Some others though believed that people in Kosovo, although living in the same place were not actually living together, but next to each other. As if both nations had their separate and parallel worlds. People described simply not having contact with each other and not knowing the 'other' side. This may sound quite shocking if one looks at the statistics and realizes that the Albanians were present in large numbers in Kosovo, yet people managed not to have contact with each other. Life seemed to be organized in such a way that the two sides did not have casual meetings in their day to day chores. As one participant explained:

"Unfortunately, I think that Serbs and Albanians lived more one next to each other, rather than with each other. Contact was only on individual basis, with a neighbour or maybe with a friend from the neighbourhood. (Participant 18; male; from Kosovo).

"Big problem for these two nations was that they did not know each other. Many families lived next door, without knowing each other". (Participant 6; male; from Serbia).

Some other participants said that tensions between the two nations existed since the time they were born (late 1970s), but that no open violence was present in this period, that they had periods of collaboration out of necessity to survive, but that each side actually wished to be independent from the other. Very few said that tensions were always there and that the two nations never lived well, while others had the opposing view and gave examples of how through history the two nations collaborated and how Albanians actually helped Serbs and vice versa.

Regarding the occurrence of romantic relationships between Serbs and Albanians, participants from Kosovo said that it used to happen, but that it was not approved of. For example, one of the participants explained:

“It was a taboo to date the person who was not a Serb. No one wanted to have their daughter or a son to marry the person from the other side...There were rare cases, but they were not approved of.” (Participant 14; female; from Kosovo).

Family and friends preferred if the person was dating someone of ‘their kind’ and looked with disapproval on mixed couples and mixed marriages, regardless of whether it was a girl or a boy who was dating the person from the ‘other’ side. However, despite the difficulties persons encountered, it did not prevent some of them to go ahead and engage in romantic relationships.

Years from 1989 until 1997

Participants from Belgrade did not make specific referral to this period of time in respect to the relationship between the Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo. It could be that since they were living in Belgrade, quite far away from Kosovo, that they were not aware of the changes in relationships between the two nations and therefore did not mention the relationship as changing through time. All the answers and evaluations below therefore refer to the opinion of participants from Kosovo.

The participants all agreed that formal divisions in the society started taking place during these years: schools were divided, with Serbs and Albanians going to separate classes and occupying distinct parts of the school building. As one of the consequences of this split, Serbs stopped learning Albanian at schools. In some cases the division went as far as that no Albanians were present in public schools and instead went to their own private schools that were set up during that time.

“It all became separate, we stopped learning Albanian at schools, they left our schools and this is how it all started. Very rarely and very few of them would come to our cafés”. (Participant 12; female; from Kosovo).

During this period of time divisions were also evident in practically all other segments of life: the two groups had their own, ethnically clean bars and cafes where they both listened to their own music. Participants said that no one actually forbid them to go to the bar where the other ethnic group was and that if they went, nothing bad would have happened, but it was simply an unwritten rule that the two sides should not mix. Few participants said that they rebelled against such division and continued having Albanian friends and did not allow the general situation to influence their personal relationships with Albanians. However, the majority of interviewees said that they lost

contact with each other; they were not fighting with each other, but rather simply stopped having any contact. This was reflected in the children's play too: they either did not play with Albanian friends. They did, they were playing against each other. Mixed teams were not a common thing.

"We played separately from each other, sometimes when there would be team games, we played against each other in front of our building. There were no fights, but simply it was all divided...at least that's my experience". (Participant 14; female; from Kosovo).

It is striking what influence political decisions (such as to have separate schools) have for the human relationships, particularly the children. The decision for such a split was initiated both from top down (politicians influencing the people) and bottom up (with common people reinforcing the political decisions of the split). However, it is the children and young teenagers who had nothing to do with the political situation, that felt the changes in their own life (both Serb and Albanian). One wonders what kind of conclusions they made about the world when they saw that what made one friend or an enemy was based on person's nationality.

It is also interesting to notice the role that norms have for individuals' behaviour. Although there were no rules, no notices, no negative consequences if the two groups mixed, majority simply went with the flow and followed the unwritten rules and norms. Perhaps the age of the participants also influenced this behaviour, since they were all young at a time, being teenagers, it is a time when persons generally have friends from schools and socialize with those who are in their immediate environments. So perhaps, such results are not surprising considering the maturity and age of interviewees at this period of time.

Years from 1997 until 1999

For this period of time, no opinions by Serbs from Serbia were expressed as regards the relationship between Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo. As mentioned in the previous section, this could be due to the fact that they were not very familiar with the situation in Kosovo and stages of conflict, so they did not make inference about the relationships between Serbs and Albanians. All opinions in this section therefore reflect beliefs of participants from Kosovo.

This period of time could be summarized as a period of open conflict between the two nations. Serbian police and army in Kosovo were said to be maltreating and expelling the Albanians out of their homes, while Albanians were said to be throwing bombs in Serbian cafes. The resentment which was slowly building up during the previous years exploded during this time. This was the period of time when dormant stage of the conflict reached its saturation point and became increasingly violent. There was the spiral of violence taking place: the more the Serbian police and army tried to suppress and repress the Albanians, the more Albanians resisted and the more violent they became. The Serbian police and army responded with even more violence and so on. The conflict reached its peak during this period of time.

"Albanians started throwing bombs in our cafes, our army and police started doing what they were doing, so this is a time I remember as the time of conflict which I personally felt". (Participant 17; male; from Kosovo).

Many participants gave explicit reference to the horrendous treatment of Albanians, particularly during the time right before the NATO bombing which started in March 1999. The NATO bombing was called a humanitarian mission by the international community and was aimed at stopping the violence on the Albanian people and removing Milošević from power, but the effects it actually had are disputable. Many participants of this study witnessed the Albanians being discriminated against and exposed to violence. One participant explained his thoughts and feelings at such a sight:

“I had this misfortune to witness lines and lines of Albanians, 80% of whom were old people and women; who were leaving Kosovo, with Serbian army and police standing next to them...if they saw someone young, they would take him behind the building and not come back with him...I watched it and felt it was wrong. But what could I have done? If you said anything, they would simply take you behind the building and you would never come back either”. (Participant 19; male; from Kosovo).

The vast majority of participants made referral to the atrocities committed by Serbs and said that this was the time when any contact between the two nations practically completely stopped. It was a time of violence, unpredictability and danger everywhere, so it could be that one felt safest in one's own group.

Post 1999 until the present time

Once the bombing ended on the 10th June 1999, a new political period began for Kosovo. All Serbian police and army troops withdrew and were replaced by the International community's force, called Kosovo Force (KFOR). Quite a number of participants from Kosovo and Serbia spoke about the difficulty that the remaining Serbs in Kosovo face since the arrival of KFOR and horrible living conditions they are in, having the freedom of movement restricted, being targets of Albanian extremists and some of them not having electricity for months. They pinpointed that this is the period when the reversal of roles has started taking place and when the atrocities were and still are largely committed by Albanians. Role of the KFOR was generally described as not protecting the Serbs adequately. As one interviewee stated:

“Some time after the KFOR troops arrived to Kosovo in 1999, my [Serbian] friend was attacked by an Albanian man with a knife in the street. She ran towards the KFOR soldier, who stood there doing nothing and just laughed in the sense: 'you Serbs deserve it anyhow'...luckily an Albanian acquaintance came by and saved her”. (Participant 4; female; from Kosovo).

Participants also described this period as the time of discrimination and human rights abuses for the Serbs. Although the conflict is largely dormant at the moment, they thought it could erupt any time in the future again. Some said that conflict seems less apparent now, since most Serbs have fled and the territory is practically ethnically clean.

As regards the property, participants from Kosovo had different experiences. It was common that as the Serbs fled the region, Albanians moved in their houses and flats.

Some participants managed to sell their property and were happy they succeeded at it, since generally it had been occupied by Albanians and they had no use of it. Some still had Albanians living in their flats at the time of interview and were not able to make them move out or sell the property for its real value. Some others however had their property completely demolished and burnt down.

“We still have a flat, but Albanians live there now. We tried through various organizations and channels to have them leave and sell the flat, but haven’t succeeded. We also called them a few times and they want to buy it from us for a symbolic price of 5000 Euros, which is ridiculous. (Participant 15; female; from Kosovo).

Half of the participants from Kosovo said they haven’t been to Kosovo since they left in 1999, out of fear or simple lack of wish to see everything changed, since they believe their town is not what it used to be and do not wish to be disappointed. The other half who have been, had mixed feelings and experiences. Some were not advised to speak Serbian in the streets, while some others did, and had no problems with it. The participants who went to Kosovo noticed a change in the population structure, saying that there are many new people living in the neighbourhoods and that the number of inhabitants (of Albanian nationality) has increased.

Beliefs about the Region of Kosovo

Numerous beliefs about the region were expressed, ranging from personal importance and relevance of the region, to the political, cultural and historical beliefs about it. Participants identified a number of mistakes done in the past and also pinpointed things which should have been done to avoid the conflict from erupting. The blame was generally put on politicians and the overwhelming majority saw no personal responsibility for the conflict and felt quite powerless to change or prevent it from occurring. While the politicians were blamed, the perceived victims were common people, civilians, on both Serbian and Albanian sides. They were the ones seen as paying the biggest price in the conflict.

The territory

There were two main issues about the territory of Kosovo which were discussed: its historical and cultural importance and personal importance. Participants from the two groups under investigation did not differ much in their opinions about the historical and cultural importance of Kosovo. The overwhelming majority of interviewees made reference to the fact that many historically important events took place in Kosovo, such as the Kosovo battle, that the first Serbian state was founded in Kosovo, they mentioned cultural importance of the monasteries and other monuments that exist in Kosovo. The difference in opinion among participants was noted on the importance Kosovo has for Serbia and its cultural, spiritual and national identity. Some believed that if Kosovo became independent of Serbia, it would be a major loss which would, among other things be reflected in the loss of national identity. Some others though believed that as long as the cultural heritage in Kosovo is respected and not being demolished, with Serbs being allowed to live there, it would not affect the national identity of people in any way.

“For Serbia, Kosovo is the most important piece of land. The first Serbian state was formed there, we have religious monuments there, and many songs are referring to Kosovo...for Serbia Kosovo is what Jerusalem is for Jews”. (Participant 8; male; from Serbia).

Differences in personal importance of Kosovo were noted between the two groups of interviewees. Not surprisingly, many participants from Serbia, although believing Kosovo was important in many ways, they did not find it to be of personal importance to them. On the other hand, many participants from Kosovo were still very attached to it, they still referred to the town they came from as their home and some dreamt of it regularly. Besides emotional attachment, it formed part of their personal identity: it was their home, land they grew up on, place to which they had many memories and experiences attached.

“Kosovo is very important, through history we fought for it, there are also so many of our monasteries there...if Kosovo becomes independent I think we will lose our identity and a part of our tradition”. (Participant 4; female; from Kosovo).

In general, the majority of participants for whom Kosovo had personal importance found it to be an important aspect for the national identity, while for those participants for whom Kosovo did not have much personal importance, they thought it was not

linked to identity much. This makes one conclude that for people who believe Kosovo is important for them, they strongly link it to the national identity, while for those for whom Kosovo is not personally important, they do not see it as one of the defining factors of what it means to be a Serb. Such differences in thoughts should be taken into consideration by persons deciding the future of Kosovo, since for some people losing Kosovo would represent a strong impact on personal and national identity. The conclusion about the outcome should be such that it caters for the beliefs and views of both Serbs and Albanians. Importance of Kosovo in relation to Serbian and Albanian personal as well as national identity should be reflected in that decision.

Mistakes in the past

Beliefs about the mistakes committed in the past did not differ much between the two groups of interviewees, although within each group there were a number of issues identified as being wrong and which had contributed towards the conflict in the region. The mistakes were either identified as mistakes of commission, i.e. referring to what was done and shouldn't have been done and mistakes of omission, referring to things which should have been done, but were not. The vast majority of participants identified as one of the bigger mistakes influx of Albanians after the Second World War and their high birth rate as a big problem of commission, since if the proportion of the population in the region had not been that different, participants believed that chances for conflict would have been smaller.

"In the distant past, Tito should not have allowed Albanians to come to Kosovo in such large numbers. They should have been given limited stay in Serbia and shouldn't have been given equal benefits as the Serbs". (Participant 9; female; from Serbia).

On the other hand, some other participants made no reference to demographics of the region, but rather concentrated on the political scene as the main mistake. They identified the leading politicians at the time (like Milošević) and Serbian police as behaving inappropriately and not managing the politics right. Some thought that Albanians should not have been maltreated during the 1990's, while others believed that they should not have been given that much freedom in the 1970's. Again, consensus was hard to find among participants, even on the issue about how Albanians were treated. A variety of reasons and beliefs were voiced.

"I think that the problem was lack of democracy. The state did not have an adequate stance towards minorities. The country should not have allowed minorities to be without a job at one point". (Participant 16; male; from Kosovo).

Mistakes of omission generally referred to lack of tolerance, lack of appropriate, open dialogue between Serb and Albanian politicians and lack of constructive dealing with problems which started accumulating over time.

An interesting observation is that on the whole, Serbian side was seen as equally, if not more, responsible for mistakes in the past. The only identified Albanian mistake, which was not in any way connected to Serbian influence, was the birth rate, while all others referred to things which Serb politicians did which were wrong, or failed to do to make things better. This again does not seem to support the group positivism

hypothesis by Brewer (2001) and Tajfel and Turner (1986), since the participants saw the mistakes as originating by the Serbian politicians and their inappropriate tackling of the situation as the problem. One wonders whether the level of education of the participants affects their opinion and influences their beliefs.

Blame

The main group on whom the blame was put by nearly all the interviewees were politicians, both Albanian and Serb. The only difference was that some participants still attributed more blame to Serbs; others attributed more blame to Albanians, while some claimed that both groups of politicians were equally guilty.

“They [Serbs and Albanians] are all together responsible and guilty. I would not be able to pick only one person or one nation as the only one to be blamed”. (Participant 1; female; from Belgrade).

There was a split in opinions about the responsibility and blame of nations in the conflict. Some believed that nations (both Serb and Albanian) had nothing to do with it and were just manipulated, while others saw them as sharing a piece of responsibility and blame, by following the politicians in power and giving them legitimacy to rule the way they did.

As regards ‘unfair’ blame some participants identified as Serbs being blamed too much, although they admitted their responsibility for atrocities. Others saw lack of blame for certain Albanian paramilitary forces and political figures as being responsible but not charged by anyone (the interviews were done before Haradinaj, the prime minister of Kosovo was sent to The Hague).

All the blame by participants was attributed to the people other than oneself. Many interviewees explicitly said that they had nothing to do with the conflict and were not responsible in any way for it. Interestingly, there was one participant who took on some responsibility and blame on herself and explained it in the following way:

“We all should take on some responsibility and blame for what had happened. Although I myself haven’t done anything horrible, I lived there and did nothing, accepted it all as something normal, which it wasn’t...and this is what I am to blame for”. (Participant 20; female; from Kosovo).

Taking on certain amounts of personal responsibility for the conflict is frequently seen as important for the process of dealing with the past. Being able to see what wrongdoings were done by one’s ‘own’ side is also seen as important, since the focus in the process is to focus on one’s own backyard and deal with it first. The role that each individual played in the conflict is also important, since it makes one see that he or she was probably not only a victim, but sometimes also a quiet bystander, a witness of events which should not have taken place, and nothing was done on part of the individual to try and change it.

On the whole, however many interviewees did not see themselves as playing a role in the conflict and felt rather powerless as regards the development of the conflict. This feeling is not surprising, particularly for participants from Kosovo, most of whom

came after the bombing as refugees and the feeling of being a victim oneself was hard to escape. The responsibility and blame for the conflict was given to the 'higher' power, i.e. politicians and officials of the country.

The ideal scenario would have been if in the past both Serbs and Albanians united to protest against violence of any kind, regardless of whether it was induced by Serb or Albanian forces. It might be that due to feelings of powerlessness that participants of this study did not do anything about the escalating conflict. Some other reasons for lack of actions could be fear, as well as the young age of the participants in this study at the time of the conflict.

Victims

For the majority of participants, the main victims were the common people of both Serbian and Albanian nationality. They were seen as the ones who felt the conflict on their own skin and suffered the most. Particularly, the participants from Kosovo gave emphasis to this point. They saw both Albanians and Serbs as the main victims of the conflict, being manipulated, used and abused by their politicians to achieve their own goals. They said that many people on both sides were left without their property, had to flee and had their family or relatives killed and this is why they are the biggest victims.

"I think the biggest victims are the common people, because they are poisoned by hatred, they can't live their own life and are being manipulated". (Participant 18; male; from Kosovo).

As has been highlighted by this participant, there were also negative outcomes which were not tangible losses and referred to a deep-seated hatred which was seen as very harmful for the individuals themselves. For propagating such feelings, media and politicians were blamed. At the end however, it is the common people who carry the burden of hatred with themselves every day. This was a rare category on which all the participants who voiced their opinion had highly similar beliefs. It is also interesting to note that participants did not see only their nationalities' common people as victims (as is often the case in conflict), but were able to see both sides as victims.

Perception of Basic Needs and Requests of Serbs and Albanians

Basic needs of all the people were thought to be the same but the degree of fulfilment of basic needs of Serbs and Albanians were seen as being different in Kosovo. The participants of the study generally saw basic needs being fulfilled by the nation who rules the province while the other nations have them lacking and find it harder to satisfy their basic needs. At the moment, Serbs were seen as having most of their basic needs denied while Albanians had them fulfilled. Opinions of what were legitimate and illegitimate requests by Serbs and Albanians varied, the hottest disputed issue was legitimacy of independence, while most consensus was reached on having human rights respected as legitimate request by both sides.

Basic needs

The participants thought that basic needs do not differ among people and that they are the same for all, regardless of ethnicity and persons' background. They also believed that they should be fulfilled for all the people and that no conditions for their fulfilment should be set. When asked to name some of the basic needs, most of the interviewees focused on one or two groups of needs and gave their opinion of whether they were fulfilled for Serbs and Albanians. Most attention was given to the survival, identity needs and freedom needs, the ones which were seen as presently mostly jeopardized for the Serbs.

"I think that basic needs are the same for all: to live a normal life, to sleep peacefully, be able to take a child for a walk, send him or her to school and not worry that someone might bully him or her on the basis of nationality". (Participant 3; male; from Serbia).

Many participants gave reference to the lack of security felt by Serbs in Kosovo, describing how they are living under constant fear of potential violence and are lacking the basic safety. The interviewees also thought that Serbs in Kosovo were not able to express their national identity in Albanian dominated regions and thought that everyone should be able to say to what group he or she belongs, speak the native language, wave a flag and celebrate national customs. Freedom needs mentioned mostly referred to persons' restricted freedom of movement (which was connected to the safety need) and to the limited freedom of expression. Just a few persons mentioned well-being as being one of the important needs and those who did, referred to need for water, food, electricity and telephone access.

"Both Serbs' and Albanians' basic needs are to have access to electricity and water for 24 hours, to have their basic conditions necessary for living fulfilled. They both need freedom of movement but I think Serbs are more restricted because Albanians are numerically larger group and hold a bigger part of territory". (Participant 16; male; from Kosovo).

As regards Albanians' fulfilment of basic needs, there were two main lines of thought: one group believed that they too do not have freedom of movement and safety needs fully guaranteed (when they live in Serb dominated areas), while the other group thought that they had secured and fulfilled all their basic needs and now concentrated on higher ones, such as for example, a need for independence. Some

participants stated that prior to 1999 it was the Albanians who did not have their safety, identity and freedom needs satisfied, while now the situation had been reversed. They did not approve of either of these situations.

“I think that they [Albanians] have their basic, existential needs fulfilled and now they are concentrating on other ones, such as developing the economy of Kosovo”. (Participant 7; male; from Serbia).

Participants named all the four different types of basic needs identified by Galtung (1994), namely the survival, well-being, identity and freedom needs. They had different opinion though on what types of needs were more important. Some thought survival was of paramount importance, while others thought freedom needs were more important. Many thought identity needs were very important, but did not say how important they were in relation to other needs.

The analysis of needs could also be done according to Maslow's (1954) theory. Very few referred to basic, physiological needs, while many mentioned safety needs. Only few identified the need to belong and be accepted as one of the human basic needs, while esteem and self actualization needs were barely even mentioned, at least when speaking about Serbs' basic needs. They mentioned higher needs when referring to Albanians, but they would not really fall into Maslow's (1954) self-actualization theory, as they referred to independence rather than to personal self-betterment.

A slightly worrying finding is that some participants believed that both Albanian and Serbian people could not have their basic needs fulfilled at the same time. This was backed up by arguments that had it been possible, it would have been done by now. Rather, they believed that only one side at a time could have their basic needs fulfilled. Such beliefs are worrying since it means that participants do not believe that the two sides can coexist as equals on the same territory and it appears they have lost hope for harmonious coexistence of the two nations.

Legitimate requests

Legitimate requests referred to what participants thought were fair requests by Serbs and Albanians and what they thought they were rightfully entitled to. This section of results is interesting to be compared to the section below entitled illegitimate requests, as some similar opinions could be found as legitimate by some, and illegitimate by other interviewees.

The overwhelming majority of participants thought legitimate requests by Serbs were to live peacefully in Kosovo, to be able to return to their homes and not be discriminated against. They also emphasized the need to move around the region freely and not feel jeopardized. Vast majority believed Albanian legitimate requests were to have schools and universities in their language, have employment and have their basic human rights respected. Some also said that those are the requests they had during the 1990's and they think they should be fulfilled, but they thought it was not enough for them and that they wanted more. Participants said that Albanians had most of the things named above (such as education in their language, human rights respected etc) but that they still protested and wanted more, so they believe independence has always been their real goal.

“If you ask me what is the legitimate request, it is the respect of human rights, because it is something set by international conventions and every violation of human rights is illegitimate”. (Participant 10; male; from Belgrade).

Some opposing views about legitimacy of Serb and Albanian requests were expressed. Very few said that Serb legitimate requests were for Kosovo to be part of Serbia and equally few said they thought Albanian legitimate requests were to have Kosovo independent of Serbia. Those believing Kosovo should be part of Serbia gave arguments such as that Kosovo had always belonged to Serbia and that it is an integral part of Serbia, whereas those who thought independence was a legitimate request by Albanians gave explanations such as that it is their right to ask for it since they are the majority in the region, but that they need to assure the minority rights for all other nations living in Kosovo.

“I don’t know other requests they have, apart from demands for independence, which I think is legitimate. Everyone has a right to ask for an independent country. What is illegitimate is if it stays like it is now, with Kosovo having I don’t know how many more inhabitants than in 1999 and with practically all Serbs gone...” (Participant 17; male; from Kosovo).

Illegitimate requests

The overwhelming majority said they believed Serbs had no illegitimate requests at the present moment, since all they were asking for at the moment were bare conditions for survival to be fulfilled. Therefore, according to these interviewees, all the things for what Serbs were asking for at the time they were entitled to it. As one participant put it:

“At the moment I don’t think they have any illegitimate requests, because they only wish to secure their basic survival”. (Participant 13; male; from Kosovo).

Very few participants said that illegitimate requests by Serbs were to be the absolute power in Kosovo and that although it was ‘theirs’, Albanians should be given certain power and some division of rule should be established. They also said they were not sure if some Serbs wanted it, but if they did, it would be illegitimate request to have Kosovo ethnically clean of Albanians.

As regards the Albanian illegitimate requests, the vast majority of participants said their quest for independence was not legitimate. They gave arguments such as the international law and documents all stating that Kosovo is part of Serbia, that Serbs were there long before Albanians and that just because they were numerically more in the region did not entitle them to have it as their own country.

“I think that their quest for independence is illegitimate, because I do not understand on what grounds they are asking for the whole of Kosovo to be theirs”. (Participant 5; female; from Serbia).

The main division line in opinion in both legitimate and illegitimate requests section was over the issue of independence. Whether they were pro- or against independence, they all had very strong opinion about it and found evidence to

support their thinking. This is an issue that is important to consider, especially since this year the final status of Kosovo should be decided and people will need to accept and live with whichever outcome is reached.

Perceptions of Different Ethnic Groups in Kosovo

General descriptions are bound to bring out a lot of presumptions and stereotypes, both positive and negative. However, the participants of this study tried to guard against overgeneralizations and in most cases acknowledged that exceptions to their statements existed. Whether the results of this study are such because the sample consisted of youth who were educated and from large cities, is not known and in order to be able to generalise the findings, further research needs to be conducted with a different sample. A few participants did not even wish to express their opinion about different nations since they thought such categories of classification were too broad. Purely dichotomous views were not predominating in this study and a wide spectrum of beliefs and perceptions was observed. General conclusion is that participants had more to say about their own nation and allowed for greater variability in their own group than in 'other' groups they described. Greater ingroup variability confirms the Relative Homogeneity Effect put forward by Lee and Ottati (1993). This effect was particularly visible when they gave physical description of their own as opposed to the Albanian nation.

Serbs

The majority of participants identified both positive and negative characteristics of Serbs. There was a lot of variation in beliefs about what traits Serbs possess. No consensus was reached, but there were certain traits that were mentioned by a number of participants.

About the positive traits, the most voice was given to the characteristics describing Serbs as friendly, communicative, good hosts and as people who are open for cooperation with others. The main underlying notion was that Serbs are genuinely good people who are willing to help and establish friendly relations with other people. One of the participants put it across in the following way:

"I would describe Serbs as good hosts, with a good sense of humour, as very friendly and definitely as a very pretty nation. But we also have negative traits, such as envy".
(Participant 8; male; from Serbia).

Other Serbian characteristics mentioned were generally reflecting views of just one or two people and included the following: belief that Serbs have a good soul, that they do no harm, that they have charisma and forgive easily. Tolerance, intelligence and a good sense of humour were also some other attributes given. A few traits given to Serbs referred to myths and history, such as statements that Serbs are the heavenly people and that they never attack but rather just defend what is theirs. Therefore, this study found confirmation for Đurić's (1980) finding that Serbs are seen as a cheerful nation, but other attributes for Serbs in his study such as braveness, hardworkingness and perseverance were not voiced. Trebješanin's (1995) finding that Serbs are seen as having insufficient education was not confirmed in this study; on the contrary, participants thought Serbs are well educated people. This finding might be due to the fact that the reference points for comparison were often Albanians, for whom many thought were uneducated.

In general, participants from Kosovo and Serbia did not make distinction between Serbs from Serbia and Serbs from Kosovo, but a few did. Those who did, referred to differences in mentality between two groups. Some of those participants from Kosovo described Serbs from Kosovo as warmer, friendlier and more helpful to each other than Serbs from Serbia, while the participants from Serbia generally made no further elaborations as to how the mentality of the two groups was different, but some participants said that actually Serbs from Kosovo were more similar to Albanians than to Serbs from Serbia, since they inhabited the same land and lived together for so long. One participant from Serbia also pointed out that many Serbs from Kosovo are treated with some form of resistance Belgrade and other parts of Serbia and that there should be an effort to integrate them into the society better. A participant from Kosovo explained the difference between the two groups of Serbs in the following way:

“Serbs from Kosovo are much friendlier. It seems to me that in Belgrade everyone is concerned only about one’s own self- interest, whereas Serbs in Kosovo are more concerned with the collective rather than individual well-being”. (Participant 15; female; from Kosovo).

Most commonly mentioned negative Serb characteristics were the following: stubbornness, envy, naivety and difficult character. The lack of national feeling and national belonging was also seen a negative trait. The finding of Trebješanin’s (1995) study that Serbs are perceived as naïve and lacking unity was confirmed in this study. Some participants in this study also thought that Serbs were presenting themselves much harsher and stronger than they actually were and were seen as much milder than wishing to admit. Some other qualities not so frequently mentioned were the following: tendency to idealise and look for short term benefits, warrior nation, lazy and lacking good manners.

“Serbs are a very diverse nation, there are so many different mentalities present, that they are hard to be described... They are also very controversial as a nation and difficult to understand”. (Participant 9; female; from Serbia).

Participants found it hard to give physical description of Serbs and generally described them in opposition to other nations, such as ‘Serbs being darker than Russians’, ‘prettier than Hungarians and Albanians’, ‘different from other Slavic nations’ and so on. The participants generally said that Serbs are a mixture of many nations, including variety of Slavs and Turks and that this is the reason why no general description could be given. However, this might also reflect the Relative Homogeneity Effect where members of ingroup are seen as much more diverse than members of the outgroup (Lee and Ottati, 1993). Those who did describe Serbs, they generally said that Serbs were of medium to high stature and had dark hair.

Albanians

Albanians were given a variety of attributes as a nation, both describing them in a positive and negative light. Many participants allowed for exceptions in their descriptions, but despite this, a general difference in opinion between participants from Kosovo and participants from Serbia was noted: the participants from Kosovo mostly gave both positive and negative descriptions, while participants from Serbia

gave predominantly negative description of Albanians. Their perceptions also tended to be more rigid and more uniform than those of Serbs from Kosovo.

A large number of participants from Kosovo, and few from Serbia, described Albanians as very honest, responsible and reliable people. They perceived Albanians as very trustworthy and good business partners and said if something was agreed on with them it would be certain and they would never lie or abuse their given word. Some other positive characteristics included their unity, dedication and kindness. They were described as good neighbours and as hard working people. Some descriptions of Albanians included general terms such as 'they are good people', and 'I don't think they are bad'.

"You can rely on them, they are always willing to help you and keep their promise when they give it to you. They can be a very good and relaxed company". (Participant 19; male; from Kosovo).

As regards the negative characteristics, two arguments were most commonly heard by both groups of participants: that Albanians are less educated, more primitive or less intellectually advanced than the surrounding nations and that they can be impulsive and aggressive. Such a belief was quite widespread among the participants, although they acknowledged that not all Albanians were like that, but in their opinion, the majority were. Some other, less frequently stated opinions included description of Albanians as easily manipulated people (which is the same description given to the Serbs too) and as having strong nationalistic feelings.

"Well, I see them as generally backward people...I don't think all are like that but that's how I imagine them. I do not see them as bad people, but as simple". (Participant 2; female; from Serbia).

Unlike when describing Serbs, many participants said they could easily distinguish Albanians from other nations by their 'specific facial features' and found Albanians to generally look alike. They were described as dark people, with dark hair and dark eyes, with strong and sharp facial features. One participant explained this physical distinctiveness in the following way:

"It's not nice to say, but it's true: they are an ugly nation. They have characteristic facial features: sharp facial lines, much emphasized jaw and teeth...And as people, they are very good neighbours, very friendly and willing to help". (Participant 14; female; from Kosovo).

Regardless of what opinion participants had of Albanians, the overwhelming majority of participants both from Serbia and Kosovo, when asked whether they would be friends with Albanians if they met them in their social circle, they all said they would. Therefore, despite some of the negative perceptions, it would not seem to influence their personal relationships with individual members of the Albanian nation. Although such a finding is very encouraging, it should be taken with a reservation and precaution, since it is only based on a hypothetical relationship, and no real life test of such an attitude was conducted.

Although there were exceptions in each group, on the whole participants from Serbia generally had more uniform and more rigid beliefs about Albanians than participants

from Kosovo. Such thinking is most probably reflecting the presence of stereotypes, which as said by Rot (2003) are characterised by rigidity of thinking. Such a difference in findings might also be due to lack of contact by participants from Serbia with Albanians, since participants from Kosovo were interacting with many Albanians in their life and were able to see that there are different Albanians, with diverse characteristics. Such findings could be interpreted as supporting the Familiarity hypothesis of Linville, Fischer and Salovey (1989), since the more contact the participants had with Albanians, the more diversely they perceived them. Generally, the opposite seems to hold as well: the less contact the participants had, the more rigid the thinking was. Although such pattern was observed, it is important to note that there were participants from Serbia who despite not having considerable contact with Albanians, did not hold negative views towards them. Likewise, there were some participants from Kosovo who perceived Albanians in a negative light. Human beliefs are too complex to be explained simply by the amount of contact, although it may be one important factor. However, other parameters need to be identified that shape the beliefs and attitudes of people in order to be able to account for a myriad of beliefs.

What Albanians might say about Serbs

This category might be a bit tricky to understand, since the Serbs were asked to say what they *think* the Albanians would say about Serbs were they asked, and does not reflect the opinion of Albanians.

Participants generally thought that most of the Albanians would describe them in very negative ways. Some thought Albanians would see Serbs as enemies, killers, repressors and conquerors and would feel hatred towards them. It would be interesting to know whether this is due to the anticipated 'reciprocal distortions', a finding by Bronfenbrenner (1961), which states that the members of ingroup and outgroup often see each in a similar light. It might be that participants thought that the view of Serbs by Albanians would be generally very negative and prejudiced, in the same way as the view of Albanians by Serbs is. One participant said:

"I think they have prejudice against us. Not all, but many. I think they see us as enemies". (Participant 1; female; from Serbia).

Participants thought that such beliefs would be based both on myth and experience. Opinions based on myth would be due to political and media propaganda, while those based on personal experiences would refer to encounters they had with the Serbian police during the years of 1998 and 1999. Very rarely did participants say their beliefs would be based either purely on myth or purely on experience.

Quite a number of participants also thought that Albanians would give both positive and negative description of Serbs, depending on the experiences they've had and depending on how open minded they would be.

Turks, Roma and other minorities

The participants from Serbia generally made no referral to other ethnic groups living in Kosovo. It could be that participants did not see them as very relevant to the conflict or that simply that they saw them either as similar to Serbs or Albanians, so they thought it might not be important to mention them separately. The following section is therefore based on the perceptions of people from Kosovo only.

Turks were generally seen as a neutral side in the conflict and on the whole were perceived as more integrated with Serbs than the Albanians. Participants related this to the fact that they continued going with them to the school, while Albanians had stopped.

“We had a great relationship with Turks, we went on school excursions together, had good relations. They were somehow not involved and neutral, not wanting to appear as taking sides in the conflict”. (Participant 20; female; from Kosovo).

They were generally described with only positive traits. They were said to be good friends with them and that as a nation they were generally good looking and well-mannered. So in this category, positive stereotyping of a particular group is taking place. The uniformity might also be great because they are generally contrasted to the ‘outgroup’. i.e. Albanians.

Roma people were seen by the people as having been treated in the conflict as Serbs: being killed or forced to flee. As a nation some people described them as ‘very specific’ and as being the same wherever they lived. They were perceived as not very welcome in Kosovo by Albanians, and made no reference to their own attitude towards them.

The Future of Kosovo

The status of Kosovo is still formally undecided and there are many speculations among the common people of how it will turn out. There is a sharp difference between the ideal and the expected outcome, reflecting the general attitude of hopelessness among people when Kosovo and future of remaining Serbs there were discussed. Despite all the negative and difficult things this conflict had brought, especially for participants from Kosovo who have fled the region, they all had something positive to say about what they had learnt from such an experience.

Expected future

Opinions of what the future of the province will be like were diverse. Some expected things to stay the same and equally bad for the Serbs, while some others hoped that by making concrete changes, situation could be improved. The issue of what was likely to make the situation better or worse was not agreed on.

Possible and expected outcomes of the status of the province were discussed at length by participants. The discussions centred mostly on the issue of independence or division of the region. The probability of the outcome and the interpretation of the meaning of those outcomes varied.

“Considering that people are talking about the division of Kosovo more and more, I think that this might be the best solution. It would not be completely what we wanted, neither completely what they wanted, but I think it is the only way”. (Participant 5; female; from Serbia).

Quite a number of participants from both groups endorsed the idea that some kind of division or cantonisation of the region would be the best option at the moment. According to their opinion this would ensure that Serbs would be able to stay in Kosovo and live peacefully in enclaves. This option would save at least a piece of Kosovo from being ‘lost’. However, many participants were sceptical about the possibility of something like this actually being decided this year as the outcome.

Many participants also discussed the issue of independence of Kosovo as an outcome and the opinions were divided about the impact it would have for Serbs and their culture. Some participants believed that independence would be detrimental for the Serbian culture, history and for remaining Serbs in the region, who were expected to be expelled. They worried that if Kosovo became independent, it would be a great loss for Serbs and Serbia and that in the future wars would be fought again to regain the territory.

“When Kosovo becomes independent they [Albanians] will try and expel the few remaining Serbs. We will not have any security to go back”. (Participant 15; female; from Kosovo).

On the other hand, some participants believed that regardless of whether Kosovo was part of Serbia or not, the culture and all the history related to the Kosovo region would not be lost; it would continue being studied and treasured by generations to come. Some also believed that independence would actually improve the safety of Serbs living there. They thought that once the Albanians accomplished their goal of independence, Serbs would not be seen as a threat anymore.

General feeling across the various answers of interviewees was that the future is quite bleak, regardless of the outcome and that it is just a question of degree how bad it will be. Some kind of hopefulness or expectation of a good ending to the conflict was virtually nonexistent. Conflict has been going on for a long time, many promises of improvements were being done over the course of years, none of which were being carried through, so this attitude of resignation and hopelessness might just be a natural reaction to the previous experiences.

Ideal future

The participants had very similar views and wishes of how the ideal situation in Kosovo would be and there were very few exceptions to this line of thinking. This time, the focus was not on the status of the region, but on the quality of life for all the people of Kosovo.

Participants wished that they all lived together in peace and with an attitude of respect towards each other. They wished people were divided into good and bad based on their quality as people, not based on their ethnicity. For many, multiethnic Kosovo was the ideal situation.

“I would like all the people in Kosovo to be mixed, to live together and be equal. I would like division into Serbs and Albanians to be gone and that they all simply become people of Kosovo”. (Participant 4; female; from Serbia).

Participants from Kosovo frequently mentioned a time in the past of how they wished it to be again. That past always referred to the time when in their opinion the two sides lived together well, played together as children and helped each other. The main concern was with the well-being of all the people, without wish for one side, even their own, to dominate or be privileged over the other side. Unfortunately, many interviewees mentioned, that as much as they wished for this ideal scenario to happen, they felt it was very unlikely or simply impossible to occur after all that had happened.

“I wish for people to be equally concerned for their own and for others’ well being and that they do not accept situations where only one side is happy and the other is suffering. But this is utopia and it will never happen”. (Participant 18; male; from Kosovo).

The few interviewees, who had a different opinion from majority, mentioned the ideal situation as being without Albanians or having a wall separating the two sides, like the one between Israel and Palestine. They thought that only in that way would peace be achieved. They acknowledged that their ideal solutions are unfortunate, in the sense that they are not what the ideal should be, but they saw that as the only way towards peace, which is something to be strived for.

Participants from Kosovo were divided on the opinion of their wish to return there, although they wanted to be given the chance to go back if they wished. Some participants expressed strong wish to return and continue their life there, saying they were dreaming every day about Kosovo. Other participants though said that their life had moved in a different direction now and that they do not have anything to go back

to, even if it were possible, since they said the population structure had changed, their city had changed and it was not the same anymore.

Steps of achieving the ideal scenario

When participants were asked to elaborate on their vision of the ideal situation and ways of achieving it, they were very pessimistic about it and saw it as virtually impossible. Some said it was too late now to fight for the ideal situation, since so many bad things happened in the past. Others said that there are practically no minorities left, so fighting for multiethnicity now was seen as an illusion. Some participants did not know where from to start working towards the ideal situation and saw it as too complicating to be achieved.

Some other participants, although acknowledging that it would be a long and time consuming process gave some suggestions as to how the ideal should be achieved. Their suggested steps were seen as just *some* of the things to be done, and acknowledged that there is probably much more that needs to be done. Some of the things every person can do was highlighted by the following participant:

“If you can manage to change the negative state of mind of your neighbour, that’s already an important step forward. We should all try and eliminate negative factors around us which are stirring up the conflict”. (Participant 1; female; from Belgrade).

Participants emphasised the need for an open dialogue between the Albanians and Serbs, ability to listen to the other side and readiness to compromise and openness to solutions acceptable for all. Some also said that the perceived negative influence of foreign actors should be diminished, and that people of Kosovo should decide for themselves through dialogue and talks what is best for them. Some participants also mentioned that all the persons who committed war crimes on both sides should be put on trial as this was seen as a way of satisfying the justice and paving a way for a fresh start between Serbs and Albanians. One of the ways of paving a way for a better future was seen by making a change in the educational system and rewriting of school books, which would be objective and would be teaching about diversity and tolerance.

In order to work towards a better future, the wrongdoings committed in the past should be acknowledged, some said. Both sides need to be ready to accept their own atrocities, speak about them and put it behind them. Past cannot be forgotten, but it needs to be dealt with in order to have a brighter future ahead for all.

Lessons learnt

The participants mentioned a number of things which should be learnt from this conflict and referred both to things which should have been done and to those which should have never been done. Participants from Kosovo and Serbia had highly similar views on this topic and in general very few participants said there was nothing much that could be learnt since we failed to learn from previous conflicts and since situation was predetermined to be this way.

The participants mostly emphasised the fact that in the future politicians should be trusted less and that the people should be more sceptical about their ideology. More reliance on one’s own judgments of what is best is needed and less following of the masses should be done. Participants thought it is the general people who know what

is best for them, much better than the politicians who are interested in their own political gains.

“The message would be that everything is better than war and that war never should have happened”. (Participant 16; male; from Kosovo).

As can be seen from the quote above, some participants thought that violence, open conflict and war were not an option. When the whole situation is summed up, it always turns out that everything else would have been better and with less pain and casualties than war. Many participants said they thought that the way the situation was handled was wrong and they thought that many things could have been done differently. Every experience is a learning experience and so is this one. Hopefully lessons learnt from this conflict, particularly about the options of solving the problems, have been learnt by the leaders of the countries too. If it was learnt, then peace is to be seen and felt, if not, then really a murky future lies ahead for all.

Chapter Five

Conclusion

Final Thoughts

Conflict in Kosovo was seen as multidimensional and very complex by the participants. They acknowledged its long history and various complexities surrounding it. In this study numerous different beliefs, values, feelings and expectations were expressed that provide an insight into the Serbian implicit culture. This final chapter discusses only some of the main findings of the study.

No gender differences in this study were found. Gender seems not to be a factor influencing or shaping the participants' thoughts about Kosovo. It appears that there are other factors which play a more important role in shaping their opinions and beliefs.

Often the variation in opinions within each group was the same as between the groups, but there were certain issues on which different patterns of thinking were observed between participants from Kosovo and participants from Serbia. The differences between the two groups were mostly on issues where experience and familiarity with the conflict might play a role. The following were some of the topics where variations in opinion between the two groups of participants were noted: conflict origin in time (participants from Kosovo mentioned years of 1980's more while participants from Serbia mentioned time after the Second World War and Tito's time); reasons for conflict (participants from Serbia referred to cultural differences, while participants from Kosovo did not mention it at all and instead focused on human rights dimension); the role of the Nongovernmental organisations and the relationship between Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo from 1989-1997 (participants from Serbia did not make referral to it, while participants from Kosovo did); importance of Kosovo (not surprisingly for the participants from Kosovo, Kosovo had greater personal importance than for participants from Serbia); perception of Albanians (generally participants from Kosovo attributed both positive and negative characteristics, while participants from Serbia focused more on the negative ones); other ethnic groups in Kosovo (participants from Serbia did not mention them specifically while interviewees from Kosovo did); the ideal future of Kosovo (some participants from Kosovo referred to a point in the past as the ideal scenario, while interviewees from Serbia did not).

The above mentioned distinctions highlight the main patterns that were observed, but it should be kept in mind that there were participants from each group who did not have the same opinion like the majority of participants from their own group. One could hardly find any issue on which there was complete agreement by *all* the participants within the group. Therefore while analysing the results and their possible implications it should be kept in mind that even when, on the whole, a certain pattern of thinking was observed for the group, there might have been exceptions to the general opinion. This chapter offers analysis and possible reasons for differences in opinions between the two groups.

The time of the conflict was not agreed on. Participants from Serbia referred more to the post Tito and post Second World War period as the time when conflict in Kosovo had started, while participants from Kosovo emphasized more the time during the eighties and nineties of the last century. This might reflect differences in experience: media exposure vs. personal experience. It might be that participants from Belgrade saw the period after Second World War to be the origin, because this was talked about in the media more, while for participants from Kosovo it might be the later years because this is the time when they, personally, felt the considerable difference in the society to be taking place.

There was a tendency by participants in this study to see relations between Serbs and Albanians as divided and varying according to the period of time in question. General political situation was seen to have an influence on the population as a whole and their inter-ethnic encounters. The amount of contact between Albanians and Serbs might have diminished on the whole, but changes in political atmosphere did not seem to affect the personal relationships which were already established. There was a noted decline in group encounters, i.e. having a group of Albanians socialising with a group of Serbs, but individual friendships were said not to have suffered. It appears that those individuals who already had good Albanian friends, the majority continued their friendship regardless of the division of society which started taking place. However, the others, who did not have close ties with Albanians, simply adjusted to the situation as it was and had friends from their own ethnic group. It was striking to hear how the division of society had taken place, without any physical divisions in the form of barbed wire or high walls existing to separate the two nations. Norms of the society, the unwritten rules, were simply so strong that over a period of time two completely separate and distinct societies were virtually formed.

Although this is very useful for creating a general picture of relationship between the two nations, care should be taken not to generalise and allow for exceptions to be seen. So for example, although during the 1990's Albanians were largely discriminated against and although Serbs are mostly discriminated against in the post 1999 period, this is not *always* so, and should be kept in mind. There have been, and still are, cases of Serbs and Albanians living well with each other, regardless of the general political situation.

Importance of the region of Kosovo was perceived differently by the participants. There were some interviewees from both groups, for whom Kosovo was seen as important for the Serbian nation and they thought it forms an important part of their national identity. They saw Kosovo as being a Serbian national heritage, having abundances of monasteries and churches, symbols of the Serbian Orthodox culture. Some thought it would all be lost if Kosovo became independent. For some others, besides national, there were also personal links to Kosovo and those were predominantly the participants who lived in Kosovo. Having strong personal ties is not surprising since Kosovo is a place where they grew up and where they had their home.

However, there was also a group of interviewees, for whom Kosovo, although undoubtedly important historically, did not make much impact on one's own life. The group of interviewees with such opinions thought that although Kosovo was politically and historically important, whether it stayed part of Serbia in the future, it would not

have an effect on either their personal or national identity and this was reflected both by some participants from Kosovo and Serbia.

Galtung's vision of Serbian deep culture as being based on defeat, retreat and return was partially supported by the findings of this study (J. Galtung, personal communication, May 18, 2004). Many participants said they expected Kosovo to get independence and be lost for the Serbs. However, they also thought that although Serbs would be defeated in this way and forced to withdraw, a time in the future would come when they would try and regain it. This has been seen as taking place throughout history. Kosovo was lost in the past, but was regained later and then lost and regained again and so on for many times. The history related to Kosovo reassures people that one day the time will come to regain it again, since it has been done so many times before. Furthermore such a belief was seen as being part of the Serbian deep culture, meaning that it is inherent in one's thinking and is hard to change, since it mostly operates on the subconscious level. However there were also some participants who were sceptical about Serbian will to fight for it in the future, while others thought it would happen for sure, and that it was just a matter of time. There should be a way to accommodate both Serbian and Albanian implicit cultures when deciding on the final solution. It should be such that beliefs, values and heritage of both nations are preserved and that a win-win solution is reached. Having a win-lose outcome will undoubtedly create resentment and grievance for the group perceived as the loser and might lead to future violence.

Conflict in Kosovo was developing and taking place over a number of years, yet participants both from Kosovo and Serbia generally felt helpless to make a change and influence the development of the situation in any meaningful way. They saw it all in the hands of politicians and thought that they themselves, as individuals, could not have done anything to change the conflict from erupting. Considering the age of participants during the time of conflict, this finding is not surprising. However, it makes one question why the older generations of people did not stand united against the escalating violence. Was it due to lack of information about what was actually going on? Or perhaps out of fear? Or because they had other daily things on their mind? Getting an insight into this area would be useful, since it might show the thinking processes which allow the individual to stand powerless and not take an active stand in creation of one's own future. Understanding the processes involved might help prevent future conflict from occurring by empowering the individuals of both groups in conflict to unite and fight for their human rights and basic needs *together*.

The two perceived main sides involved in the conflict were Albanians and Serbs, which supports Horowitz's (1985) explanation that there is generally one main enemy for every actor in the conflict. Although this finding was confirmed, the blame for the conflict was not directly put on the 'enemy'. Rather, politicians (both of one's own and of the other group) as well as the international community along with the media manipulations were seen as the main responsible actors for the conflict. Therefore, although the dichotomy did exist in that there were *two* main sides in the conflict, many other actors were also seen as having a stake in the conflict. Bitterness expressed by many related to the politicians of both sides and the international community the most. The enemy was not seen to be purely in the Albanian nation (although they were thought to be playing an important role in the conflict too). If such

findings are confirmed in the general population as well, it would be encouraging for the possible future cooperation or simple coexistence of two nations, since not all the blame is put on the 'other'. That would give a window of opportunity for building more positive relations, especially since the common people were seen as victims on both sides. Therefore the hatred and anger does not seem to be directed to the common people of the other population, but to other actors such as authority and politicians.

Basic needs of people in Kosovo were not thought to be fulfilled as they were seen as lacking various degrees of freedom, identity, survival and well-being needs. It was acknowledged that basic needs have not been fulfilled for a number of years, even decades and that this had aided the development of conflict. Both Albanians and Serbs were seen as not having basic needs satisfied, but the main problem was that one side always had more basic needs fulfilled than the other, and the division was based on one's ethnicity. Galtung's theory (1994) of basic needs seems to find support here, since lack of satisfaction of basic needs is seen as one of the reasons that fuels conflict. This finding also supports Gaskell and Smith's (1984) Relative deprivation theory since both Albanians and Serbs were denied access to certain positions and were discriminated against at various points in time. This in turn leads to hostility and facilitated development of violence. If Kosovo is to become truly peaceful one day, division of society based on ethnicity needs to stop and other characteristics need to become more important than nationality or religious beliefs. For that to occur, many changes should take place. Politicians should change their discourse, past needs to be dealt with and truth needs to be established, and when all of it is done, some time needs to pass to reassure people that change is for real and that ethnical discrimination will not continue. Regaining the trust of people however might be difficult, since they have been played up by various politicians so many times in the past that now they hardly believe anyone. Therefore, patience as well as hard work are needed to make a real and long-lasting progress and fulfil the basic needs of all people.

Various opinions about the character and physical traits of Serbs and Albanians were expressed. The characteristic Serbian trait given most voice was their goodness, kindness and friendliness. They were also not seen as an invasive power, since Kosovo was seen as belonging to Serbia (although Albanians were generally accepted to continue living there). Overall the conflict in Kosovo was seen as being of a defensive nature. The opinion of Zurovac (1997) about Serbs not engaging in aggressive or conquering wars was confirmed in this study as well. Some negative characteristics of Serbs, such as naivety and envy mentioned by Milosavljević (2002) were also mentioned by some of the participants.

Although all participants in this study were Serbs, some participants also noted the division in perceived character within the Serbian nation, depending on which part of the region they were from. The split between Serbs from Kosovo and Serbs from Serbia was based on the alleged difference in character and customs of the two, although physically they were not seen as differing. It appears that sense of ingroup is strongest and most uniform when compared to a distinct outgroup, but when there is no comparison to the outgroup, divisions of the ingroup start becoming apparent. For example, defining Serbs in opposition to some other nations is easier than defining Serbs on its own category. It appears that closer looking at one's nation produces further division based either on the region or customs they have that are different from one's 'own'.

Various opinions of Albanians were given, with participants from Kosovo generally describing them with more variety and with more positive characteristics than participants from Serbia. The most disliked characteristics of Albanians pertained to their perceived lack of education and traits such as aggressiveness, although the high birth rate was also seen as problematic by certain interviewees (and was also identified as one of the reasons for conflict). The finding of Vučo (2001), which says that customs most disliked in other cultures relate to eating habits, hygiene and sexual behaviour, seems to have found partial support in this study too. Some participants thought that the Albanian high birth rate was a result of inappropriate level of education and reflective of their lower level of cultural development. Perhaps a surprising finding was that the biggest difference in the perception of Serbs and Albanians lied in their physical characteristics: Serbs were seen as very diverse from each other, of varied height, stature, hair and eye colour, while the Albanians were frequently seen as very distinctive from other nations and quite similar to each other. This finding confirms the Relative Homogeneity Effect by (Lee and Ottati, 1993), since members of the outgroup are seen as very homogenous and similar amongst themselves, while members of the ingroup (in this case the Serbs) are seen as very different from each other. It is not clear whether such findings are due to Familiarity effect, which states that more members of one's own group are known and are known better so that is the reason why they are seen as more diverse than members of the outgroup (Linville, Fischer and Salovey, 1989). The findings might also be due to stereotypical beliefs, since they are characterised by rigid and prototypical thinking.

The finding of Milosavljević's (2002) literature review was also confirmed in that the participants of this study saw Albanians as having sharp facial features and as being of slim physical stature. As was mentioned by Anastasijević (2004), the general belief of Albanians as being less educated was confirmed in this study as well. Whether it arises from a general lack of experience with educated Albanians or reflects ignorance of such experiences and reflects a stereotype, it is not clear. Important though is that participants of this study who held such beliefs, were ready to acknowledge that not all Albanians were that way, and that exceptions did exist.

Another difference in character between Serbs and Albanians was noted, which pertained to the perceived unity of nations. Albanians were seen as being united, while Serbs were seen as constantly disagreeing with each other and unable to unite. This opinion was also reflected in the perceived goal of Albanians, where participants were confident their only goal was independence, while for Serbs they thought they had a number of different goals for Kosovo and thought Serbs were not united. One might argue that this is again due to the Relative Homogeneity Effect (Lee and Ottati, 1993). It could be that the Albanians are perceived as more united because they are simply less well known and participants are less aware of internal disagreements they as a nation might have. However, the finding might also reflect the reality of the situation on the ground, since Serbian politicians are frequently giving incompatible goals and solutions for Kosovo. For example, prior to the Kosovo elections of October 2004, the Prime Minister of Serbia (Mr. Koštunica) urged Serbs from Kosovo to boycott the elections, while the President (Mr. Tadić) encouraged them to vote and take part in the political structures in Kosovo. Not only this, but once the elections were over, with a negligible percentage of Serbs' participation, some of the politicians who were in favour of boycotting the elections, actually started favouring the idea that

Serbs should take part in the parliament and political structures in Kosovo. Serbs in Kosovo at the moment seem to be left to themselves, while the politicians in Serbia try to score political points and fail to agree on the best solution for the people. So at the moment, this characteristic is seen as the most negative one, and which is harming Serbs the most. Having a greater degree of uniformity and agreement is thought to be crucial for greater stability and political achievements.

Participants said they expected to be described generally by negative terms by Albanians. This showed that interviewees expected the confirmation of the 'reciprocal distortions' put forward by Bronfenbrenner (1961), which means that the participants are likely to hear from the other side the same opinion as what they had said about them. Participants though acknowledged that there would definitely be some Albanians who would not be prejudiced and that it would depend on the experiences the person had with the Serbs as well as on the degree of person's open mindedness.

There were various opinions expressed by the participants regarding the final status of Kosovo. Many participants in this study thought it to be a good solution to have either whole of Kosovo belong to Serbia or have it divided so that Serbs have their autonomy within Kosovo. Such beliefs support Rothman's (1997) findings that persons will fight for autonomy or independence if they see that their dignity, safety and efficacy are threatened. However, there were also some participants who contradicted such findings, as they thought that independence of Kosovo would be good for Serbs themselves, and would give them greater security and better life conditions than any other option. It is therefore not clear what is it that makes some people believe that one's own autonomy is better and others that autonomy under someone else's rule would bring more benefits.

It was interesting to examine the findings of this study in light of Tajfel and Turner's (1986) Social Identity Theory. Social categorization between Albanians and Serbs was found to be present, since the two groups were seen as distinct from each other on a number of variables, including religion, cultural customs, physical appearance and character traits. Social identification and ingroup positivity varied among participants. Some participants showed strong ingroup favouritism and outgroup negativism, but there were others who did not exhibit these signs. It might be that the degree to which national identity plays a role in determining the personal identity that influences the beliefs person holds about the other ethnic groups. However it might also be due to the personal experiences one had with the members of the outgroup or the type of information about the other group one was exposed to. Intergroup comparison was seen as taking place on a number of issues, ranging from the perception of whose Kosovo is (or should be), to the general comparison of the two nations. Participants from Serbia generally had a more negative view of the outgroup than participants from Kosovo, since some of them attributed reasons for conflict to be due to cultural differences, and gave more negative descriptions of Albanians than Serbs from Kosovo. This is particularly interesting, since it appears that people who have very little or practically no experience of the 'other' group, have worse opinion of them than those that actually lived with the 'other' group. A reason for this might be due to stereotypes which are restricting one's view. If so, then it appears that participants from Serbia hold stronger stereotypes than participants from Kosovo. More empathy towards Albanians was reflected in the answers of interviewees from

Kosovo than from Serbia when talking about the period of time when Albanian abuse was common. Direct experience of another person's suffering appears to make it easier for one to empathise with the individual, even though he or she may form part of the potentially dangerous outgroup. Although many bad things have happened, and participants have either heard or witnessed atrocities taking place, there were also numerous positive experiences they had with the members of the other group. And it is such positive experiences that should be given voice as well as serve as an example for the future relations of the two groups. Although easier said than done, it should be an ideal to be strived for.

No strong negative stereotyping of the other group was seen as much as might have been expected, considering that the conflict in the province of Kosovo had been going on for quite a while. Therefore the expectation of Brown (1991), that during the times of crisis, collective identities gain special power was not supported here, since many participants were seeing both positive and negative aspects of their ingroup. It is encouraging to find out that generally the youth in this study did not fall into the trap of extreme negative stereotyping, nor expressed very negative hostility or aggression towards the other group. However, this finding might apply only to youth with a certain level of education and it is questionable what youth from smaller villages and with lower levels of education think. This is a limitation that should be kept in mind before any generalisations or wider applications are attempted to be made based solely on this study. However, even in this study there were some participants, although in very small numbers, who did have very negative views of the other side and their opinions and beliefs should not be neglected. Persons with strong prejudice against members of other groups should be the targets of education, since their opinion counts equally as the one of persons without such prejudice. And if there is to be peace in the region, a culture of acceptance and respect for diversity is to take the dominant role.

The expected future of the region was seen as rather gloomy. Many participants expressed their worry of what is to happen to the people of Kosovo once the status is resolved and wondered about the possibility of refugees and internally displaced persons to be able to return one day. The general tone among the participants was of resignation and acceptance of whatever is to come, since they felt powerless of changing anything. Although they wished only the best for Kosovo and people living there and many wished for everyone to live together in peace, their expectations did not match their ideal wishes. Reality was seen as much more cruel and darker than they hoped for. Many years have gone by since the open violence between the two nations has formally stopped, but not much positive progress has been seen by the participants, so they have simply stopped expecting anything positive anymore. Although many see it as unfair, they do not feel empowered to make a change in that respect. However, one of the things that participants thought they learnt from this latest conflict was self-reliance and they suggested that even in the future, people should trust their own thinking more than the politicians' words.

Limitations of the Study and Suggestions for Further Research

This study was of an explorative nature, carried out on a small sample of participants. For the conclusions of this study to be generated to the greater population, further research, with a larger and representative sample is needed. The aim of this study was to give a brief overview of the opinions of young people about the issue of Kosovo and is by no means an exhaustive study of the topic. Further research into many points raised in this study would be needed to gain a comprehensive view of the topic. The richness of the study though is in its brevity and in giving an idea of how Kosovo is seen by young adults with a particular level of education.

One of the limitations of this study is that it did not include persons currently living in Kosovo. For future research it would be interesting to examine the opinions and beliefs of all the ethnic groups living in Kosovo and see what issues they agree and disagree on. Working groups or focus groups consisting of participants from different ethnicities would be one of the ways of doing it.

The findings of this study reflect the opinion of youth from urban cities and with a tertiary degree of education, which may have an influence on their views. The beliefs of the youth from more rural areas and with lower levels education may have yielded different results, so caution should be taken when using the results of this study to apply to a wider population.

In this study the views of young adults were examined and elaborated on, and in the future research it would be interesting to compare the views of other age groups and see whether and what differences exist among them. In this study it was decided to research the opinion of young adults, since they are the future decision makers of the country. They are also the ones whose adaptation and reaction to the situation are of most interest, since they represent a generation of people who went through rough times during their growing up period. The period of maturation is on its own full of challenges, let alone when one needs to face political difficulties along the way as well.

The interviews were carried out in Serbian language, so the quotes used in the results and analysis section had to be translated. Care was taken that the meaning of the sentence stayed the same, by consulting with other persons knowledgeable in both Serbian and English language. However, in translation, some meaning is always lost.

Conclusion

Results obtained from this study reflect various complexities surrounding the issue of Kosovo. It is a difficult and very sensitive topic, which needs to be handled carefully. Anyone who might still hope for an easy and quick solution should give up. There are no shortcuts, no painless lessons and the way forward needs to be taken one step at a time. This study might not have brought about any new, striking insights, but it did show which issues should be taken into account by decision makers when deciding the future of the region. They should be encouraged to remember that they are dealing with human lives, and that it is the people who will carry the effects of the decisions through and feel its effects. They should remember that every human life is worth the same; there are no privileged or less worthy ones. Decisions should be able to satisfy basic needs and secure the respect of human rights for all. Sounds like a utopia? Considering that we are living in the 21st century, the basic satisfaction and respect for the human lives should not be too much to ask for.

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Appendix A

Questions for the interview

English version:

What is the conflict in Kosovo about?

1. In your opinion, when did the conflict in Kosovo start and how?
2. What do you think is the reason for conflict in Kosovo today? (What is the contradiction, where is the problem?)
3. What role, if any, does a religion play as a source of the conflict and as a potential tool for its resolution?
4. Who is responsible for the creation of conflict? (e.g. Serbs, Albanians; politicians; common people)
5. What are the goals of Serbs in Kosovo?
6. What are the goals of Serbs in Serbia (for Kosovo)?
7. What are the goals of Albanians in Kosovo?
8. What are the goals of Albanians from Albania? (for Kosovo)
9. Who do you think are the main players/actors in this situation?
10. Is there anyone or a group of people that is left out and forgotten about? (e.g. Ashkali, Roma, orthodox Albanians....)

How did the conflict occur?

1. Was there anything in the past that could have been done differently that would result in a better situation today? If yes, what?
2. Was there anything that Serbs could have done differently to have a better situation today? If yes, what?
3. Was there anything that Albanians could have done to have a better situation today? If yes, what?
4. Is there anyone on whom the blame was put unfairly (*feeling of victimisation*)?
5. Is there anyone who is to blame but hasn't been blamed?

Examining attitudes, stereotypes and prejudices

1. Do you know any people from Kosovo (Serb or Albanian)? If yes, what kind of relationship do you have with them?
2. How would you describe Serbs as a nation? (Their physique and character)?
3. How would you describe Kosovo Albanians? (Their physique and character)?
4. How do you think Albanians see Serbs? Would the opinion be based on experience or myth?

For interviewees from Kosovo:

1. Did you have (and do you still have) Albanian friends? If not, why not?
2. When did the division between Serb and Albanian people start happening, when did you first become aware of it?

Analysis of basic needs

1. What do you think are the basic needs of Serbs in Kosovo?
2. What do you think are the basic needs of Albanians?
3. Do they differ among people?
4. What are the basic needs of Serbs that are not satisfied?
5. What are the basic needs of Albanians that are not satisfied?
6. What do you think, is it possible that both sides have their basic needs satisfied at the same time?

Deep dimensions of basic needs

1. How important is Kosovo politically, historically and culturally for Serbia?
2. How important is it for you personally?
3. Are there any illegitimate requests of Albanians? If yes, which ones?
4. Are there any legitimate requests of Albanians? If yes, which ones?
5. Are there any illegitimate requests of Serbs? If yes, which ones?
6. Are there any legitimate requests of Serbs? If yes, which ones?
7. What are the national myths related to Kosovo? What effect, if any, do they have in this conflict?
8. Are there experiences in the past of 'collaboration', cooperation, cohabitation? Do you think it is possible at the moment? If yes, under what circumstances?
9. Are there any institutions/ structures that are not allowing the situation to improve? If yes, which ones?
10. Are there some institutions that are helping the situation improve? If yes, which ones? If not, how do you think they should look like if they are to be created?

Construction of new attitudes and goals

1. If you had magical powers that could change things, how would you like to see the situation in Kosovo? How would the ideal situation look like?

Construction of new behaviour

1. What is the way of moving towards this ideal vision (even if it may seem unrealistic at the moment, try and envisage what steps would need to be taken to arrive at that point)
2. What lessons if any can be learnt from this conflict?

Serbian version:

Oko cega i o cemu je konflikt na Kosovu?

1. Po tvom mišljenju, kada je konflikt na Kosovu počeo i kako?
2. Šta misliš koji je razlog za konflikt na Kosovu danas (Šta je kontradikcija, gde leži problem?)
3. Da li, i koju ulogu, religija igra kao izvor konflikta ili kao potencijalno oruđe za rešenje konflikta?
4. Ko je odgovoran za stvaranje konflikta? (npr. Srbi; Albanci; politicari; narod)
5. Koji su ciljevi Srba na Kosovu?
6. Koji su ciljevi Srba iz Srbije (za Kosovo)?
7. Koji su ciljevi Albanaca na Kosovu?
8. Koji su ciljevi Albanaca iz Albanije (za Kosovo)?
9. Ko su po tvom mišljenju glavni akteri u ovom konfliktu?
10. Da li po tvom mišljenju postoji neka grupa ljudi koja ja zaboravljena ili marginalizovana u ovom konfliktu? (npr. Askali, Romi, pravoslavni Albanci itd)

Kako je konflikt nastao?

1. Da li je moglo da se uradi bilo sta drugacije u proslosti sto bi dovelo do bolje situacije nego sto je trenutna? Ako da, sta?
2. Da li su Srbi mogli da urade bilo sta drugacije da imaju bolju trenutnu situaciju? Ako da, sta?
3. Da li su Albanci mogli da urade bilo sta drugacije da imaju bolju trenutnu situaciju? Ako da, sta?
4. Da li postoji neko ko je nepravedno okrivljen? (*Osecaj viktimizacije*)?
5. Da li postoji neko ko je kriv a nije bio okrivljen?

Ispitivanje stavova, stereotipa i predrasuda

1. Da li znas ljude sa Kosova (Srbe ili Albance)? Ako da, koju u kojim si odnosima sa njima?
2. Kako bi opisao Srbe kao naciju? (njihov fizicki izgled i karakter)
3. Kako bi opisao Kosovske Albance kao naciju? How would you describe Kosovo Albanians? (njihov fizicki izgled i karakter)
4. Sta mislis kako Albanci vide Srbe? Da li bi to misljenje bilo na osnovu iskustva ili mita?

Za ispitanike sa Kosova:

1. Da li si imao/la (i da li jos uvek imas) prijatelje Albance? Ako ne, zasto?
2. Kada je po tvom mišljenju pocela da se desava podela izmedju Srba i Albanaca, kada si ti to poceo/la da primecujes?

Analiza osnovnih potreba

1. Sta mislis koje su osnovne potrebe Srba (na Kosovu)?
2. Sta mislis koje su osnovne potreba Albanaca?
3. Da li se osnovne potrebe razlikuju medju ljudima?
4. Koje su osnovne potrebe Srba koje nisu zadovoljene?
5. Koje su osnovne potrebe Albanaca koje nisu zadovoljene?
6. Sta mislis, da li je moguće da osnovne potrebe obeju strana budu istovremeno zadovoljene?

Duboke dimenzije osnovnih potreba

1. Koliko je Kosovo vazno politicki, istorijski, kulturoloski za Srbiju?
2. Koliko je ono bitno za tebe licno?
3. Da li postoje nelegitimni zahtevi Albanaca? Ako da, koji?
4. Da li postoje legitimni zahtevi Albanaca? Ako da, koji?
5. Da li postoje nelegitimni zahtevi Srba? Ako da, koj?
6. Da li postoje legitimni zahtevi Srba? Ako da, koji?
7. Koji su nacionalni mitovi o Kosovu? Da li, i koju, ulogu oni igraju u ovom konfliktu?
8. Sta mislis, da li u proslosti postoje periodi dobrih odnosa ova dva naroda? Da li je moguće tako nešto ovog trenutka? Ako da, pod kojim okolnostima?
9. Da li postoje institucije/strukture koji koce poboljsanje situacije? Ako da, koje?
10. Da li postoje institucije/strukture koje olaksavaju resenje situacije? Ako da, koje? Ako ne, kako bi one po tvom misljenju trebalo da izgledaju i kako da funkcionisu?

Gradjenje novih stavova/ciljeva...

1. Kada bi imao/la magicne moci, kako bi zeleo/la da vidis situaciju na Kosovo? Kako bi ta idealna situacija po tvom misljenju izgledala?

Gradjenje novog ponasanja

1. Koji je put ostvarenja tvoje idealne vizije? (iako mozda izgleda nemoguće trenutno, pokusaj da vidis koji koraci bi trebalo da se preduzmu da se dodje to takve situacije)
2. Koje lekcije mogu biti naucene iz ovog onflikta?

Appendix B
English version:



EXPLORATION OF SERBIAN IMPLICIT CULTURE IN RELATION TO KOSOVO

Student: Katarina Putnik
Lauri
Lecturer at the Department of
Psychology
Austria

Supervisor: Dr. Mary Anne

University of Malta
Malta

I am currently working on my dissertation, which is part-fulfilment of my Master's degree given by the **European Peace University, Austria.**

The aim of this research is to investigate feelings, attitudes and beliefs of two target groups:

- 1) Youth who lived all their life in Belgrade
- 2) Youth who currently live in Belgrade but are from Kosovo

The research aims to look into historical and cultural factors that may have an influence on the present situation in the region and investigate possible alternatives to the current situation.

Thank you very much for your good will and co-operation in this research.

Please tick:

Gender: Male
 Female

Age: years

Nationality: Serbian
 Montenegrin
 Other

Religion: Orthodox
 Catholic
 Muslim

Please specify _____

Other Please Specify _____

Occupation: _____

Place of living: _____

Participation in this research is voluntary and I understand that I can withdraw from it at any time without consequences.

I am also aware that the information disclosed will be recorded and kept strictly confidential. No information that reveals my identity will be released or published without my specific consent to the disclosure.

Signature of the Interviewee

Date

Serbian version:



ISPITIVANJE SRPSKE IMPLICITNE KULTURE U ODNOSU NA KOSOVO

Student: Katarina Putnik
Mirovne studije i transformacija konflikta
European University Center for Peace Studies
Austrija

Supervizor: Dr. Marry Anne Lauri
Profesor na odseku za psihologiju
University of Malta
Malta

Ovo istraživanje je deo magistarske disertacije, koja je sastavno deo mojih postdiplomskih studija na Evropskom univerzitetskom centru za mirovne studije u Austriji.

Cilj ovog istraživanja je da ispita osećanja, stavove i verovanja dve ciljne grupe ljudi:

- 1) Mladih koji su ceo svoj zivot proveli u Beogradu
- 2) Mladih koji trenutno zive u Beogradu, a poreklom su sa Kosova

Rad ce takodje istraziti istorijske i kulturoloske faktore koji mogu da imaju efekta na sadasnju situaciju u regionu i ispitati moguće alternative trenutnoj situaciji.

Zahvaljujem se unapred na vasem pristanku da ucestvujete u ovom istrazivanju.

Molim naznacite:

Rod: Muski
 Zenski

Starost: ___ godina/e

Nacionalnost: Srpska
 Crnogorska
 Druga

Veroispovest: Pravoslavna
 Katolicka
 Islamska

Molim naznacite: _____

Druga
Molim naznacite: _____

Zanimanje: _____

Mesto boravka: _____

Ucestvovanje u ovom istrazivanju je na dobrovoljnoj bazi i upoznat/a sam da u svakom trenutku mogu bez ikakvih negativnih posledica da se povucem iz ovog istrazivanja.

Takodje sam saglasan/na da se sve prilozene informacije biti snimljene i da ce biti cuvane u strogoj tajnosti. Nijedna informacija koja bi mogla otkriti moj identite nece biti objavljena bez mog pristanka.

Potpis ispitanika

Datum